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PERPETUITIES REFINEMENT: THERE IS AN
ALTERNATIVE
Ira Mark Bloom*
A new uniform law is in the offing: a Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities (USRAP). I The law is based on the wait-and-see approach to
the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. 2 Under this approach, a waiting
period is prescribed to see whether the contingency which renders a
nonvested interest void under the common law Rule actually occurs.
The wait-and-see cause was initially championed by Professor Leach,
who in 1952 asked: "Why should we not 'wait and see' to determine
whether the contingency happens within the period of the Rule?"'3 By
1979, Professor Casner, Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Prop-
erty, convinced the American Law Institute to adopt a version of the wait-
* Professor of Law, Albany Law School of Union University. B.B.A. 1966, City College of New
York; J.D. 1969, Syracuse University. The author expresses his appreciation to Martin Belsky, Dean of
Albany Law School, and to Professors Samuel Fetters (of Syracuse), John Gaubatz (of Miami), Kenneth
Joyce (of Buffalo), John Peschel (of NYU), and John Welsh (of Albany) for their helpful comments. The
valuable student assistance of Arthur Jackman, Jr., Karen Martell, and David Prusik is gratefully
acknowledged.
I. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP) at its August, 1986 meeting in Boston, Massachusetts.
UNIF. STATUTORY R. AGAINST PERPErUIES (1986) [hereinafter Act or USRAP]. The Act is the
culmination of three years of work by the Drafting Committee on the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities Act, including its Reporter-Draftsman, Professor Lawrence Waggoner of the Michigan
Law School. See Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Progress Report on the Draft Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities, 20 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 700 (1986) [hereinafter Waggoner, Progress Report].
The Conference has completed all work on the statutory portion of the USRAP, including review by
the Conference's Style Committee. The Prefatory Note and Comments to the Act must still be finalized,
however. Letter to the author from Professor Lawrence Waggoner (Sept. 19, 1986).
Official publication of the USRAP, with Prefatory Note and Comments, is expected in early 1987.
The Act will also be submitted to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association for its
anticipated approval in early 1987. Telephone interview with John M. McCabe, Legislative Director,
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Aug. 12, 1986).
Professor Waggoner graciously furnished the author with advance copies of his Progress Report
article and various USRAP drafts. When appropriate, this article provides page references to the
Prefatory Note and Comments contained in the April 30, 1986 draft version of the USRAP. UNIF.
STATUTORY R. AGAINST PERPETUmES (Discussion Draft Apr. 1986) [hereinafter DRAFr USRAP (Spring
1986)]. Subject to minor changes and polishing, it is anticipated that the official version of the Act will
be comparable to the Spring 1986 Draft.
2. The wait-and-see component of the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP) is set
forth infra note 71.
3. Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign ofTerror, 65 HARv. L. REv. 721, 730
(1952) [hereinafter Leach, Reign of Terror].
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and-see approach. 4 If the USRAP is widely adopted by the states, 5 the wait-
and-see advocates will have succeeded in affecting "a fundamental modi-
fication of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. "6
The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to demonstrate why, in
response to Professor Leach's basic question, we should not "wait-and-
see"; second, to offer constructive alternatives to the wait-and-see ap-
proach.
Part I of this article identifies those areas of agreement between wait-
and-see advocates 7 and opponents, 8 including the acknowledged desir-
ability for some rule against perpetuities. In part II, the case for wait-and-
see is summarized and the three major wait-and-see methods are described.
These methods include: (1) the causal relationship method, (2) a measuring
lives version under the Restatement (Second) of Property, and (3) the
newly-unveiled proxy method under the USRAP. A recent debate between
Professors Dukeminier and Waggoner highlights the controversy among
4. At the American Law Institute Proceedings in 1978, Director Herbert Wechsler set the stage for
the debate over wait-and-see: "IT]he rule against perpetuities that I first learned about fifty years ago
• ..and never imagined that people would ever argue about (laughter), or was sufficiently important to
argue about, is going to be the subject of a great debate." Proceedings of 1978 Annual Meeting. 55
A.L.1. PROC. 45 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 ALl Proceedingsl (remarks of Dir. Wechsler).
In the end-after two years of heated debate-Professor Casner prevailed over Professors Powell.
Berger. Lusky. and other wait-and-see opponents. Id. at 222-309; Proceedings of 1979 Annual
Meeting, 56 AL. I. PROC. 424-81, 483-91, 521 [hereinafter 1979 ALI Proceedings.] The wait-and-see
approach is reflected in Chapter I of the volume on donative transfers. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY (DONATtIVE TRANSFERS) §§ 1. 1-1.6 (1983)
5. At its August, 1986 meeting, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
recommended that the USRAP be enacted in all the states. See infra notes 201-07 and accompanying
text for the status in early 1986 of the Rule Against Perpetuities in the United States.
6. L. WAGGONER, FUTURE INTERESTS IN A NUTSHELL 300 (1981) [hereinafter L. WAGGONER.
NUTSHELL].
7. The late Professor Leach is the acknowledged godfather of the wait-and-see movement. As
Professor Waggoner notes: "[T]hrough his writings [he] became such a devoted proponent of the
concept that it has come to be identified with him." Id. at 293; see R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES 192-93 (1966) [hereinafter LYNN] . Professor Leach's colleague. Professor
Casner, significantly advanced the wait-and-see cause by his efforts as Reporter for the Restatement
(Second) of Property. See supra note 4. Other advocates include Professors Dukeminier and Waggoner.
and the late Professor Maudsley. See infra note 9 (citing recent publications by Dukeminier and
Waggoner); Maudsley, Perpetuities: Reforming the Comninon-Law Rule-How to Wait and See. 60
CORNELL L. REV. 355 (1975) [hereinafter Maudsley, How to Wait and See].
8. The late Professors Mechem, Powell, and Simes steadfastly opposed the wait-and-see approach.
See, e.g.. Mechem, Further Thoughts on the Pennshviania Perpetuities Legislation, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
965 (1959) [hereinafter Mechem, Further Thoughts]; Posell, How Far Should Freedom of Disposition
Go'. 26 A.B. REC. 8 (1971): Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait and See"
Doctrine, 52 MICH. L. REv. 179 (1953) [hereinafter Simes, The "Wait and See" Doctrine]. Other
opponents include Professors Berger and Lusky. See 1978 and 1979 ALl Proceedings, supra note 4.
Fetters, Perpetuities: The Wait-and-see Disaster, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 380 (1975) [hereinafter Fetters.
The Wait-and-see Disaster]: 5A R. POWELL, THE LAWv OF REAL PROPERTY r 827F[3] (P. Rohan ed.




scholars regarding the appropriate methodology under a wait-and-see
approach. 9
Part III presents the case against the wait-and-see approach by address-
ing several underlying, but unfounded, assumptions. The most crucial
assumption under wait-and-see is that a severe enough problem exists to
warrant its adoption. Research, however, reveals a perpetuities violation
averaging only one relevant case per year during the eight-year period,
1978-1985.10
Part IV makes the case for refining the common law Rule, based in part
on a critique of an erroneous decision by the Indiana Supreme Court in
1985. "1 In addition, a statutory scheme for refinement is offered. Although
the statutory package partially relies on existing or proposed solutions, the
overall package has never been detailed.
In the end, rejection of wait-and-see legislation generally, and the
USRAP specifically, is urged. Adopting the wait-and-see approach to the
common law Rule Against Perpetuities would be tantamount to buying and
using "an atomic cannon to kill a gnat.' '12
I. AREAS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN WAIT-AND-SEE
ADVOCATES AND OPPONENTS
There is a general consensus concerning various aspects of the Rule
Against Perpetuities. That the Rule serves a useful societal purpose by
9. Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1648 (1985) [hereinafter
Dukeminier, The Measuring Lives]; Waggoner, Perpetuities: Perspective on Wait-and-See, 85 COLUM.
L. REv. 1714 (1985) [hereinafter Waggoner, Perspective]; Dukeminier, A Response By Professor
Dukeminier, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1730 (1985); Waggoner, RejoinderBy Professor Waggoner, 85 COLUM.
L. R v. 1739 (1985); Dukeminier, Final Comment by Professor Dukeminier, 85 CoLum. L. REv. 1742
(1985) [hereinafter Dukeminier, Final Comment].
10. Perpetuities cases for the twenty-one-year period, 1957-1977, were identified in a memoran-
dum by Professor Powell. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) 127, 143,
148-54 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1978), reprinted in 5A R. POWELL, THE LAWV OF REAL PROPERTY 827H
[hereinafter Powell Memorandum]. For purposes of this article, I have updated Professor Powell's
efforts by identifying American cases during the eight-year period, 1978-1985, which involved the
Rule Against Perpetuities. A Lexis search in 1986 produced all cases containing the phrase "Rule
Against Perpetuities." In addition, cases (including cases published in the New York Law Journal)
which were digested under the heading "Perpetuities" were identified.
The relevant cases from this universe are those which would be governed by the wait-and-see
approach to the common law Rule Against Perpetuities under the USRAP. See infra note 71 and
accompanying text. Cases which did not void an interest under the common law Rule, as well as cases
which did not specifically involve a question of validity, are not considered relevant cases.
I1. Merrill v. Wimmer, 481 N.E.2d 1294 (Ind. 1985), vacating 453 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983). Merrill is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 221-34.
12. The quotation was Professor (then Dean) Richard Maxwell's description of California's
legislative response in 1963 to a commercial transaction case. Dukeminier, Perpetuities Revision in
California: Perpetual Trusts Permitted, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 678 (1967) [hereinafter Dukeminier,
Perpetuities Revision].
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limiting dead hand control is a viewpoint almost unanimously accepted. 13
Further, most would agree that the perpetuities time period-lives in being
plus 21 years-establishes an acceptable outer limit for dead hand con-
trol.14 An English Law Reform Committee concluded as follows: "In the
absence of any compelling reasons, whether based on public policy or
otherwise (and we can see none), we prefer to leave the permitted period as
it is .... ."15
There is also general agreement on how the common law Rule operates.
Based on Gray's formulation, 16 interests which will not necessarily vest (or
fail to vest) within lives in being plus 21 years are void from their incep-
tion. 17 Moreover, vested interests which must either vest (or fail to vest)
within the perpetuities period may be invalidated under the infectious
invalidity doctrine. 18 Professor Leach described the doctrine's application
as follows:
When part of the gifts in a will or trust violate the Rule, the courts inquire
whether what is left can stand by itself ... without serious distortion of the
dispositive scheme of the testator or settlor. If the answer is negative then
other gifts-prior, concurrent, or subsequent-are also stricken out. 19
The doctrine of infectious invalidity suggests another point of agree-
ment. The transferor's intent should be carried out unless effectuation of
13. The English Law Reform Committee which recommended the wait-and-see approach stated as
follows: "Granted the necessity for placing some time limit on the vesting of future interests, which we
take to be beyond argument .... " LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, FOURTH REPORT, CMND. No. 18, 5
(1956) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ENGLISH REPORT].
The Restatement (Second) of Property provides extensive justification for a rule against perpetuities.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) 8-10 (1983) (Introductory Note); see
also L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 58-63 (1955) [hereinafter, L. SItES, PUBLIC
POLICY].
14. See. e.g., L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 13, at 68. ("[Tjhe period of the Rule would
seem still to be a workable and practical one."); Waggoner, Progress Report, supra note I. r 703.4
("IT]he traditional period works well enough as it is."). Although Professor Casner suggested the
appropriateness of shortening the period, he detected no movement to warrant a departure from the
traditional period in the Restatement (Second). 1978 ALl Proceedings, supra note 4. at 226-27
(remarks of Professor Casner).
15. ENGLISH REPORT. supra note 13, at 6.
16. "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life
in being at the creation of the interest. " J. GRAY. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942)
[hereinafter GRAY]. See generally Siegel. John Chipman Grav, Legal Formalism, and the Transforna-
tion of Perpetuities Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 439 (1982).
17. The common law Rule also applies to powers of appointment, including whether a power was
validly created and if so, whether it was validly exercised. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAwN' OF
FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1271-1277 (2d ed. 1956 & Supp. 1985).
18. Id. §§ 1262-1264; see infra note 239 and accompanying text (providing recent examples of
infectious invalidity doctrine).
19. Leach. Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsvlvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1124. 1147 (1960)
[hereinafter Leach. Hail PennsYlvania].
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that intent contravenes the public policy behind the Rule Against Per-
petuities. 20 Further, most would agree that a transferor did not intend to
extend dead hand control for too long a period, even though the Rule may
be violated by some technicality.21 All would agree that Professor Leach
masterfully identified the major areas of technical violation: the admin-
istrative contingency, the fertile octogenarian, and the unborn widow. 22
There is less agreement on whether a violation caused only because an age
requirement exceeds 21 years constitutes a technical violation;23 this article
assumes that such violations are technical. Finally, the article treats the all-
or-nothing rule as falling within the technical violations area. 24
There is also agreement that perpetuities violations caused by tech-
nicalities may be avoided by competent drafting.25 For example, the unborn
widow problem can be avoided by specifying in the instrument that the
widow must have been alive when the interest was effectively created. 26 At
a minimum, a violation can be avoided by a saving clause. Professor Casner
could not have put it more simply:
[T]here is absolutely no reason why anybody drafting a trust today should
violate the rule against perpetuities. All you have to do is to put in a provision
that 21 years after the death of A, B, C and D-naming people-this trust will
terminate .... 27
20. For example, an A.L.I. member stated: "The objective of the law in this area, tome, should be
to carry out the conveyor's intent to the greatest extent possible, subject only to restrictions on public
policy." 1978 ALI Proceedings, supra note 4, at 269 (remarks by John H. Young).
21. Professor Waggoner considers all perpetuities violations to be mistakes. See Waggoner,
Perpetuity Reform, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1718,1719-20,1782-85 (1983) [hereinafter Waggoner, Perpetuity
Reform].
22. See Leach, Perpetuities in aNutshell, 51 HARv. L. REv. 638,643-46 (1938) [hereinafterLeach,
Perpetuities in a Nutshell]. The literature has been overwhelmed with illustrations and discussions of
these traps. See, e.g., Waggoner, ProgressReport, supra note 1, 701.2 nn.9-1 1; Waggoner, Perpetuity
Reform, supra note 21, at 1726-47; L. WAGGONER, NUTSHELL, supra note 6, at 198-216 (three classic
booby traps). USRAP drafts also provide examples and discussion of these traps. See, e.g., UNIF.
STATuTORY R. AGAINST PERPETUMEs at 25-27 (Discussion Draft Feb. 1986) (examples 9-11) [here-
inafter DRAFr USRAP (Winter 1986)]. Presumably these examples will appear in the official version of
the Act. See supra note 1.
23. See Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, supra note 21, at 1726, 1748.
24. Under this rule, class gifts may be invalidated if there is a possibility of fluctuation in the class
beyond the perpetuities period. See Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 HARV.
L. REv. 1329 (1938) [hereinafter Leach, Gifts to Classes].
25. See, e.g., Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, supra note 21, at 1724-26.
26. See, e.g., DeMello v. DeMello, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 68,471 N.E.2d 406 (1984), review denied,
393 Mass. 1106, 474 N.E.2d 182 (1985).
27. 1978 ALl Proceedings, supra note 4, at 240. A saving clause (referred to by some asa "savings
clause") also provides for a "gift over" on trust termination. See infra note 178 (example of saving
clause).
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Finally, there is a unanimous feeling among those who come in contact
with it that the common law Rule Against Perpetuities is exceedingly
complex. These include law students, law professors, lawyers, judges,
legislators, tax personnel, and, of course, nonlawyers. Gray spoke as
follows:
There is something in the subject which seems to facilitate error. Perhaps it is
because the mode of reasoning is unlike that with which lawyers are most
familiar. The study and practice of the Rule against Perpetuities is indeed a
constant school of modesty. A long list might be formed of the demonstrable
blunders with regard to its questions made by eminent men, blunders which
they themselves have been sometimes the first to acknowledge; and there are
few lawyers of any practice in drawing wills and settlements who have not at
some time either fallen into the net which the Rule spreads for the unwary, or
at least shuddered to think how narrowly they have escaped it. 28
Professor Leach also acknowledged the Rule's complexity: "I confess to
some predisposition to being overwhelmed on this subject." 29
II. THE CASE FOR THE WAIT-AND-SEE APPROACH TO THE
COMMON LAW RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
A. Rationale
The wait-and-see approach developed in response to the alleged
harshness of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. 30 Under the
common law Rule, a nonvested interest must be validly created; that is, it
28. GRAY, supra note 16. at xi.
29. Leach, Forward to J. DUKEMINIER, PERPETuITIEs LAW iN ACTION, at v (1962). Professor Leach's
difficulties with the Rule are suggested in his famous Nutshell article wherein he provided the following
example to illustrate the severability doctrine:
I Elxample 34. T bequeaths $1000 to the first son of A who shall become a clergyman: but if no son
of A becomes a clergyman, then to B. [The gift over to B "if no son of A becomes a clergyman"
plainly includes at least two contingencies: (a) A having no son-which must occur, ifat all, at A's
death: (b) A having one or more sons, none of whom becomes a clergyman-which cannot be
known until the death of A's sons, a time well beyond the period of perpetuities.I A dies without
ever having had a son. Nevertheless, the gift to B fails.
Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, supra note 22, at 655.
The reader (typically a law student) is clearly left with the impression that the disposition to the first
son of A is valid. In fact, the disposition to the first son of A is invalid for the same reason that the
disposition to B is invalid The event-a son of A becoming a clergyman-will not necessarily occur
within lives in being and 21 years. In effect, the $1000 was not validly disposed of under Leach's
example.
To his credit. Professor Dukeminier recently acknowledged an error he made in a wait-and-see
problem in his widely-adopted casebook, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES (with S. Johanson) Du-
keminier, The Measuring Lives, supra note 9, at 1706 n 152.
30. See Leach, Reign of Terror. supra note 3.
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must be certain on the effective date of creation that the contingency or
contingencies which make the interest nonvested will be resolved within
the perpetuities period. Under this what-might-have-been approach, non-
vested interests can be voided under the Rule despite the virtual certainty of
the remote event actually occurring within the perpetuities period.
Wait-and-see advocates object to the common law Rule which operates
"in a sledge-hammer fashion" to defeat the transferor's intention. 31 The
title of one of Professor Leach's articles evokes our sympathies (and
enrages us about the injustices of the common law Rule): Slaying the
Slaughter of the Innocents.32 The injustices of invalidity are further com-
pounded. Property winds up in the hands of unintended-instead of in-
tended-beneficiaries. 33
The advocates further condemn the Rule because it penalizes the in-
tended beneficiaries for the mistakes of lawyers. 34 Because violations can
easily be avoided, the common law Rule only traps the unwary lawyer.
35
Further, it is alleged that the wealthy will not suffer because they have
competent counsel. 36 As described by Professor Dukeminier, "[T]he wait-
and-see doctrine is presented as consumer-protection legislation for the
average consumer of legal services." 37
B. Wait-and-see Solutions
According to wait-and-see advocates, a system must be designed "to
grant interests that would have been invalid under the common law Rule a
reasonable chance to be valid." 38 Under such a system, a drastic reduction
in litigation would allegedly result because the remote event would most
likely occur within the waiting period. 39
31. Waggoner, Progress Report, supra note 1, 701.
32. Leach, Perpetuities: Slaying the Slaughter of the Innocents, 68 LAv. Q. REV. 35 (1952).
33. See, e.g., Maudsley, How to Wait and See, supra note 7, at 364. After positing that perpetuities
violations are caused by mistakes, Professor Waggoner invokes the equitable principle of preventing
unjust enrichment as a doctrinal basis for the wait-and-see approach. Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform,
supra note 2 1, at 1719-20. See generally Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of
Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1982).
34. See, e.g., 1978 ALI Proceedings, supra note 4, at 273-74 (remarks of Dean Robert A. Stein).
35. Id.
36. See W. LEACH & 0. TUDOR, THE RULE AGAINST PERPErIriES 228 (1957); see also infra note
190 and accompanying text.
37. Dukeminier, The Measuring Lives, supra note 9, at 1649. The Restatement (Second) of
Property provides the following justification: "The adoption of the wait-and-see approach ... is largely
motivated by the equality of treatment that is produced by placing the validity of all non-vested interests
on the same plane, whether the interest is created by a skilled draftsman or one not so skilled."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS), ch. 1, Introduction, at 13 (1983).
38. Waggoner, Perspective, supra note 9, at 1717.
39. 1978 AL! Proceedings, supra note 4, at 249 (remarks of Professor Casner).
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Whatever wait-and-see system is constructed, its essential operation
involves waiting to see whether a nonvested interest actually vests or
terminates within some time period. Assuming the event does not occur
within the prescribed time period, the current advocates agree with the
Restatement (Second) position40 that courts should have the cy pres power
to reform the interest, which, on "waiting and seeing," eventually turns out
to be invalid. 4 1
The current dispute, evidenced by a recent debate between Professors
Dukeminier and Waggoner, involves the appropriate method for marking
off the perpetuities waiting period. 42 Three major alternatives have been
suggested: (1) the causal-lives method, (2) a formula method to identify
lives, and (3) a period-in-gross approach. The first two alternatives provide
a system for identifying the measuring lives; the third alternative is a proxy
for the time period produced under a measuring lives approach. Draft
versions of the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP)
recommended only the second and third alternatives. 43
Professor Dukeminier recently provided a comprehensive discussion of
the causal-lives method. 44 It involves three steps. First, identify those lives
in being who are causally connected to vesting. Second, test for certainty of
vesting within the lifetimes of the identified persons plus 21 years. Third, if
it cannot be said with absolute certainty that the event will occur within 21
years after the death of any identified person, wait and see whether the event
actually occurs within 21 years after the deaths of those identified per-
sons-the measuring lives.
Professor Waggoner argues that the process for identifying causal lives
raises perplexing problems. 45 As the reporter for the committee drafting the
USRAP, he rejected the causal-lives method "because it was concluded
that even perpetuity scholars, to say nothing of non-experts in the field,
cannot agree on the precise meaning of [the causal-lives] language." 46
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.5 (1983).
41. See, e.g., Dukeminier. The Measuring Lives, supra note 9, at 1713. The Uniform Statutory
Rule, drafted by Professor Waggoner, also provides for cy pres reformation after the waiting period.
USRAP § 3 (1986) (set forth and discussed infra text accompanying notes 135-48). The English version
of wait-and-see does not have a cy pres component. Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964. § 3(1).
See R. MAUDSLEY. THE MODERN LAW OF PERPFETUITIES 232 (1979) [hereinafter R. MAUDSLEY. THE
MODERN LAW].
42. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
43. See UNIF. STATUTORY R. AGAINST PERPETUITIES (Discussion Draft Aug. 1985) (second alter-
native) [hereinafter DRAFT USRAP (Summer 1985)]; DRAFT USRAP (Spring 1986), supra note I (third
alternative). The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities adopts a 90-year proxy period. See infra
note 71.
44. Dukeminier, The Measuring Lives, supra note 9. at 1654-74.
45. Waggoner, Perspective, supra note 9, at 1718-26.
46. DRAFT USRAP (Spring 1986). supra note 1, at 9.
Vol. 62:23 1987
Perpetuities Refinement
The wait-and-see method under the Restatement (Second) of Property
differs from the causal-lives method. Adopted by the American Law
Institute in 1979 at Professor Casner's urging,47 this method purports to
identify the measuring lives by prescribing specific categories. 48 As Pro-
fessor Dukeminier explains, however, persons who were initially listed as
measuring lives may cease to be so and persons not initially listed may later
become measuring lives under both the causal-lives and Restatement
methods. 49
Professor Dukeminier attacked the Restatement (Second)/Waggoner-
backed approach on several grounds: "It is at best an artificial solution, at
worst an extension of the dead hand far beyond the necessities of the case
"50
Each side masterfully assailed the other's position in the recent debate.
Professor Dukeminier stated: "The Restatement criterion for measuring
lives ... contains enough puzzles to keep perpetuities lawyers in court (and
in fees!) for years."' 51 Professor Waggoner countered:
The questions go on and on. The bottom line is that the simple one-
sentence statute that Dukeminier touts as the solution to wait-and-see leaves
so many questions in doubt that, as Dukeminier says of the Restatement, it
"contains enough puzzles to keep perpetuities lawyers in court (and in fees!)
for years." 52
Professor Waggoner also conceded that problems exist under any system
which uses measuring lives to wait-and-see. He acknowledged "[t]he
administrative burden of tracing a somewhat rotating group of measuring
lives, along with the problems of who the measuring lives should be and
how to identify them." 53 He then raised "a fundamental question deserving
of serious consideration: should actual measuring lives be used at all?" 54
As an alternative, Professor Waggoner suggested a period-in-gross
method as an approximation-proxy-for the period determined by using
47. See supra note 4.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.4 (1983). There are 33 pages
of discussion under this section, together with 21 illustrations. Id. at 48-80. Professor Kurtz recently
explained Iowa's law, which virtually adopted the Restatement (Second) method. Kurtz, The Iowa Rule
Against Perpetuities-Reform at Last, Restatement Style: Wait-and-See and Cy Pres, 69 IOWA L. REV.
705 (1984).
49. Dukeminier, The Measuring Lives, supra note 9, at 1672-73, 1681-1701.
50. Id. at 1711.
51. Id. at 1694. Professor Dukeminier later concluded: "So much for the Restatement list. It may
take years of learned analysis and litigation to solve its sphinxine riddles." Id. at 1701.
52. Waggoner, Perspective, supra note 9, at 1724. The one-sentence statute of which Professor
Waggoner speaks is set forth infra note 150.
53. Waggoner, Perspective, supra note 9, at 1724.
54. Id.
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measuring lives and 21 years. 55 Although the conclusion to be drawn is
unclear, Professor Dukeminier chose not to respond directly to this alter-
native. One can assume that his major objection would lie with the tend-
ency of a period-in-gross method to unnecessarily and undesirably extend
dead hand control. Indeed, Professor Waggoner anticipated this objection:
To be sure, cases can rightly be posed that show that a fixed period of years
would allow some families to continue trusts through (or into) more genera-
tions than other families. Considering the great benefits of the period-of-years
approach, I doubt that this "advantage" to families with shorter longevities is
troublesome enough to reject the approach out of hand. 56
Professor Waggoner actively pursued a period-in-gross method. In No-
vember of 1985, Waggoner authored a 100-year-in-gross version of the
USRAP. 57 This version abandons the "conventional" measuring lives
approach to wait-and-see. 58 The 100-year period allegedly approximates
the waiting period which would be produced if a competent attorney
employed a well-conceived saving clause. 59 Regarding the factor of dead
hand control, Waggoner urged: "Aggregate dead hand control will not be
increased beyond what is already possible by competent drafting under the
common law Rule." '60
Professor Waggoner refines his thinking about the period-in-gross
method in his most recent article: A Progress Report on the Draft Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities.61 He determines for hypothetical fam-
ilies that the average age of the youngest life in being at the creation of a
nonvested interest would be 6 years. Since that child would have a life
expectancy of 69 years under the 1985 Statistical Abstract, adding 21 years
produces a period-in-gross of 90 years. 62 Waggoner leaves the exact num-
ber of years-in-gross open-ended-somewhere between 90 and 95 years,
the latter based on the life expectancy of an infant (74), plus 21 years.
55. Id. at 1726-28.
56. Id. at 1728.
57. UNIF STATUTORY R. AGAINST PERPETUITIES (Discussion Draft Nov. 1985) (100-year period in
gross version) [hereinafter DRAFT USRAP (Fall 1985)].
58. The "conventional" measuring lives methodology is acknowledged in this draft. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 6-12; see infra notes 162-79 and accompanying text.
60 DRAFT USRAP (Fall 1985), supra note 57, at 11.
61. Waggoner, Progress Report. supra note 1.
62. Id. 704. Alternatively, Waggoner suggests a floating period based on actuarial expectancies.
Id. An earlier draft prescribed the proxy method:
The allowable period is 21 years plus the number of years of remaining life expectancy of a [new-
born infantl [[5]-year old], rounded off to the nearest whole number, designated in the Total
column of the table titled "Expectation of Life and Expected Deaths, by Race, Sex, and Age," or
its successor, in the Statistical Abstract of the United States published by the United States Bureau
of the Census for the year in which the nonvested property interest or power of appointment was
created.
DRAFT USRAP (Winter 1986), supra note 22, at 6.
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Whatever period is adopted under the proxy method, 63 Professor Waggoner
predicts: "The benefit of wait-and-see [will be] provided without the costs
associated with it." 64
As approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, the USRAP provides a 90-year proxy period, 65 plus a cy pres
reformation provision. 66 The Act, however, is prospective in application, in
that it will only apply to interests created after enactment of the legislation
by a state. 67 At the same time, the USRAP sanctions judicial reformation of
preexisting documents containing a perpetuities violation. 68
III. THE CASE AGAINST THE WAIT-AND-SEE APPROACH TO
THE COMMON LAW RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
A. The Assumption of Frequent Invalidation Under the Common Law
Rule
The case for wait-and-see rests on a critical assumption: the existing
common law Rule causes problems because it frequently invalidates future
interests based on unlikely post-creation events. A draft version of the
USRAP explains: "[The] Rule is harsh because it so often invalidates
interests .... ,,69
Relevant perpetuities cases during the eight-year period, 1978-1985,
were analyzed to determine the frequency of invalidation. 70 "Relevant"
refers to those reported perpetuities cases in the United States which (1)
63. Professor Waggoner mentions another possible solution:
Instead of replacing the proxy approach for marking off the allowable waiting period, the modified
version might introduce in limited form a generationally fixed period in addition to the period
marked off by the proxy. The proposal might, for example, be to provide that an interest that would
have been invalid under the common-law Rule is valid nevertheless (I) if it vests within the lifetime
of or at the death of a grandchild of the transferor, whether or not that grandchild was in being at the
creation of the interest, or (2) if it vests within the allowable period marked off by whichever of the
proxies now under consideration the Drafting Committee selects.
Waggoner, Progress Report, supra note 1, 703.4 n.22.
64. Id. 704.
65. USRAP § 1 (1986), set forth and discussed infra note 71.
66. USRAP § 3 (1986), set forth and discussed infra in text accompanying notes 137-48. It is
predicted that the cy pres issue will arise infrequently. DRAFr USRAP (Spring 1986), supra note 1, at
61.
67. USRAP § 5(a) (1986).
68. Id. § 5(b). Judicial insertion of a saving clause into the offending instrument by using the lives
determined under the Restatement (Second) list is recommended. DRAFT USRAP (Spring 1986), supra
note 1, at 93-94. There is no guidance, however, on the gift overportion of the judicially inserted saving
clause, i.e., who will take if the nonvested interest does not vest 21 years after the death of the surviving
measuring life.
69. DRAFT USRAP (Winter 1986), supra note 22, at 8 (emphasis added).
70. See supra note 10 (describing research methods).
Washington Law Review Vol. 62:23 1987
ultimately involved invalidation of a future interest under the common law
Rule Against Perpetuities, and (2) would be subject to the Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities of the USRAP. 7 1
For the eight years, 1978-1985, research confirms the voiding of an
interest under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities in the following
number of reported appellate cases:
1978: One72  1982: None
1979: Two7 3  1983: None 76
1980: One74  1984: None 77
1981: None 75  1985: Two7 8
71. The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities adopted by the National Conference in
August. 1986 provides in part as follows:
SECTION 1. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
(a) A nonvested property interest is invalid unless:
(I1) when the interest is created, it is certain either to vest or to terminate within the lifetime of an
individual then alive or within 21 years after the death of that individual; or
(2) the interest either vests or terminates within 90 years after its creation.
USRAP § l(a) (1986).
Section l(a)(1) essentially codifies the common law Rule subject to the minor qualification by section
l(d) that "the possibility that a child will be born to an individual after the individual's death is
disregarded." See DRAFT USRAP (Spring 1986), supra note 1, at 21-32; see supra note I (explaining
reliance upon Spring 1986 draft). Section l(a)(2) provides the wait-and-see component of the Rule-a
90-year waiting period. See DRArT USRAP (Spring 1986), supra note 1, at 32-36. Other portions of
Section I provide comparable rules for testing whether a power of appointment is validly created.
USRAP § l(b) & (c) (1986); see DRAFT USRAP (Spring 1986), supra note 1, at 38-40
Section 4 provides seven classes of exclusions from the Statutory Rule under Section I. including
inapplicability in the nondonative transfer area. USRAP § 4 (1986). Accordingly. the approximately 25
cases from 1978 through 1985 involving perpetuities violations in the commercial (nondonative
transfer) area are not considered "relevant." See infra text accompanying notes 318-21. The Act also
excludes interests, powers, and other arrangements which were not subject to the common law rule or
are excluded by another statute. USRAP § 4(7).
This article also excludes donative transfers involving royalty interests. See Drach v. Ely, 10 Kan.
App. 2d 149,694 P. 2d 1310 (royalty interest created under will violated Rule). rei'd, 237 Kan. 654,703
P.2d 746 (1985) (vested mineral interest not void under the Rule). Although such donative transfers
were not excluded from the Act, it was not because the Drafting Committee believed such transactions
should be subject to the Statutory Rule. To the contrary, the Drafting Committee believed that certain
mineral interests, created by either donative or nondonative transactions, should be invalidated if not
vested within a 40-year period. DRAFT USRAP (Spring 1986), supra note 1, at 81-84. Ultimately, the
committee believed it preferable to provide mineral interest rules through separate legislation. Letter to
the author from Prof. Waggoner (May 19, 1986).
72. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Brody, 174 Conn. 616, 392 A.2d 445 (1978) (1922
testamentary trust). Although Connecticut earlier adopted a limited form of wait-and-see, the statute
only applies to interests created after October 1, 1955. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-98 (West 1981).
73. Walker v. Bogle, 244 Ga. 439, 260 S.E.2d 338 (1979) (1978 will); Nelson v. Kring, 225 Kan.
499, 592 P.2d 438 (1979)
74. Dickerson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 268 Ark. 292, 595 S.W.2d 677 (1980) (1967 testamentary
trust) In Berry v. Union Nat'l Bank. 262 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1980). the court exercised its reformation
power to save an interest which would have been voided under the common law Rule.
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There were also two lower court New York cases involving invalidity based
on the manner of exercising a power of appointment. 79
In summary, the analysis discloses only eight relevant perpetuities cases
during the 1978-1985 period.80 In effect, there was, on the average, but one
relevant perpetuities case per year in the United States. 81
The inescapable conclusion is that no problem of frequent invalidation
presently exists under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. Thus,
the case for the wait-and-see approach cannot be justified on this basis.
The same conclusion was reached in earlier periods. In 1955, Professor
Simes argued: "I do not think that the hard cases which he [Professor
Leach] discusses are of sufficiently frequent occurrence to cause us to
overturn the fundamental bases of the Rule." 82 In 1959, Professor Mechem
asked: "[H]as there really been a reign of terror, a slaughter of the
innocents [as suggested by Professor Leach]? '83 Mechem's conclusions:
I doubt it. For one thing, I think if such a charge could be documented, Mr.
Leach would have done it. If I am not mistaken, in none of his articles has he
collected authorities tending to show that any very great number of wills have
currently been the innocent victims of the rule. I have not counted noses (if
cases have noses) and I do not assume to set myself up as an authority, but I
75. The court in May v. Hunt, 404 So. 2d 1373 (Miss. 1981), validated a disposition under the
common law Rule, but reformed the trust to comply with a unique Mississippi rule on restraining
alienation. Id. at 1380-81.
76. See Merrill v. Wimmer, 453 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. App. 1983), vacated, 481 N.E.2d 1294 (1985)
(intermediate appellate court exercised its reformation power to save an interest); see also infra text
accompanying note 226.
77. Barton v. Parrott, 25 Ohio Misc. 2d 8, 495 N.E.2d 973 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1984), involved a will
provision which empowered trustees to establish an annual horserace. Because the trustees were
authorized to use the property beyond the perpetuities period, this honorary trust was declared void. See
generally L. SIMES & A. SMrrH, supra note 17, § 1394. Barton is not considered a relevant case since it
involved a trust duration issue, as distinct from the USRAP which tests the validity of nonvested
interests and powers of appointment. See supra note 71.
78. Merrill v. Wimmer, 481 N.E.2d 1294 (Ind. 1985) (discussed infra at notes 221-34 and
accompanying text); Commerce Union Bank v. Warren County, No. 85-12-011 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
Commerce Union Bank was reversed in 1986 by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, 707 S.W.2d 854
(Tenn. 1986) (discussed infra note 219).
79. In re Will of Grunebaum, 122 Misc. 2d 645, 471 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Surr. 1984); In re Harden,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 17, 1985, at 13, col. 6 (N.Y. Co. Surr.).
80. This number includes a 1985 Tennessee case which, on appeal in 1986, was held not to violate
the common law Rule. See supra note 78. There were no reported cases during the eight-year period,
1978-1985, which declared a power of appointment invalidly created. See supra note 71 describing
subsections l(b) and (c) of the USRAP (relating to validity of created powers).
81. During this eight-year period, there were three Canadian cases digested under "Perpetuities":
Re Roberts, 82 D.L.R.3d 591 (Ont. H.C. 1978); Re Manning, 84 D.L.R.3d 715 (Ont. App. 1978); Re
Lawson, 33 N.B.2d 462 (Q.B. 1981). No violation of the common law Rule was found in any of these
cases.
82. L. SIMFS, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 13, at 64.
83. Mechem, Further Thoughts, supra note 8, at 966.
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have been browsing through advance sheets and reading perpetuities cases for
quite a number of years and it is not my impression that the casualty rate is
high. . . . [Even assuming] three or four casualties a year. . . [or] [diouble
that . . . it's still a trifle. 84
Based on Professor Powell's identification of 28 cases of invalidity
during the 21-year period, 1957-1977,85 Professor Berger similarly con-
cluded: "[W]e are asked, in order to deal with the occasional instances
where an incompetent lawyer fails to adhere to the limitations of the rule, to
accept this beguiling principle of wait-and-see. '86
Professor Leach responded to Professor Mechem by suggesting other
sources of perpetuities problems apart from appellate opinions in which
invalidity was found. 87 These included: (1) cases in which the gift was
upheld on appeal after being held invalid (or valid) in the trial court, (2)
cases which were settled, either before or after, a trial court ruling, and (3)
cases where the issue existed but was never raised. Each point bears
scrutiny.88
First, Leach suggested that appellate cases validating a disposition were
relevant. Although he acknowledged that such cases could not illustrate the
harsh consequences of the Rule because interests were not invalidated, his
concern stemmed from the legal fees which indirectly diminish the prop-
erty intended for the beneficiary. 89 Professor Leach's concern is a valid
84. Id.
85. Powell Memorandum, supra note 10, at 143. 148-54. According to Professor Waggoner's
analysis, 22 of these cases involved violations of a noncommercial nature. Waggoner, Perpetuity
Reform. supra note 21, at 1784 n. 162.
86. 1979 ALl Proceedings. supra note 4, at 454 (remarks of Professor Berger).
87. Leach. Hail Pennsylvania. supra note 19, at 1131-32. In reply, Professor Mechem observed: "I
can only say that in my experience the reported cases normally afford at least a rough index to the
activity in a given area, and they do not suggest to me that the Rule is causing a 'slaughter of the
Innocents."' Mechem, A Brief Reply to Professor Leach. 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1155 (1960).
88. As Professor Lynn stated: "But Leach's position with respect to reforming the Rule is that of
the advocate. His briefs are persuasive, but they are not invulnerable." Lynn, Reforming the Common
Law Rule Against Perpetuities, 28 U. CHi. L. REV. 488,491 (1961). In fact, Professor Leach may have
overlooked a possible category of unreported or undetectable cases. See Merrill v. Wimmer, 481
N.E.2d 1294 (Ind. 1985) (discussing unreported trial court decision): Millwright v. Romer. 322
N.W.2d 30, 31 (Iowa 1982) (citing I re Summers, 292 N.W.2d 877 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979)). There is no
evidence that this category is significant. See supra note 87 (Professor Mechem's observation).
89. Sears v. Coolidge, 329 Mass. 340, 108 N. E.2d 563 (1952). Leach pointed to Sears as follows:
But the list of parties occupies four full pages of the printed record (229 pages); and after all
possible consolidations eight briefs were submitted (417 pages) and six counsel argued orally. The
total fees allowed to dozens of counsel and guardians ad litem in the main estate and a half-dozen
subsidiary estates is a matter of public record, but the additional fees charged to individual clients
who stood to lose millions upon an affirmance will never be known; let each have his guess as to the
probable total.
Leach, Hail Pennsylvania. supra note 19, at 113 1.
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one, and the existence of validating litigation does suggest a reason to refine
the Rule.90
Second, Professor Leach pointed to settlement activity in the per-
petuities area. Indeed, he suggested that the all-or-nothing result of litiga-
tion encouraged settlement. 91 In an effort to discover the volume of settle-
ment activity during the 1978-1985 period, court personnel for the
surrogate's courts of three major New York counties (representing a com-
bined population of over 3 million) were contacted. 92 The results were
rather startling: There was not even one case settled in these three courts
during the eight-year period.
Mr. Richard B. Covey, one of this country's leading wealth transmission
practitioners, was also contacted. 93 Mr. Covey advised that he had never
participated in an out-of-court settlement of a perpetuities case, nor had he
ever heard of such a practice.
Finally, Professor Leach was concerned about cases where a perpetuities
violation existed but was not detected:
So, my learned friends will say, what harm is done in these cases? Only this: if
the defect is voluntarily revealed or an astute internal revenue agent spots it,
then the person who has not asserted his rights will find himself subjected to a
gift tax liability. Is this the way we want the Rule to work? 94
When written in 1960, the federal gift tax exemption level was
$30,000. 95 Leach's argument may have had some merit, assuming he was
correct that perpetuities violations are confined to dispositions by the less
wealthy. The federal gift tax exemption equivalent is now $600,000.96 On
Leach's assumption, there will be no federal gift tax problem. If, on the
other hand, perpetuities violations also occur among the wealthy, there
should be no federal gift tax problem because the gift tax value of a future
90. See infra Part IV.
91. Leach, Hail Pennsylvania, supra note 19, at 1132.
92. In 1983, the combined population of Bronx, Erie (Buffalo), and New York Counties was
approximately 3,600,000. 1984-85 NEw YORK STATE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 23 (11th ed. 1985).
93. Mr. Covey, a graduate of Harvard College and Columbia Law School, is a partner in the New
York City law firm of Carter, Ledyard & Milburn. He is the author of THE MARITAL DEDUCTION AND
CREDIT SHELTER DISPOSITIONS AND THE USE OF FORMULA PROVISIONS (1984) and GENERATION-SKIPPING
TRANSFERS IN TRUST (3d ed. 1978). He is also the editor and primary author of PracticalDrafting, a new
will and trust drafting service. Mr. Covey serves as special tax counsel to the American Bankers'
Association for trust and estate tax matters and speaks frequently at continuing legal education
programs and tax institutes. He is a Visiting Adjunct Professor at the University of Miami School of
Law, from which he received an Honorary Doctor of Laws degree.
94. See Leach, Hail Pennsylvania, supra note 19, at 1132.
95. I.R.C. § 2521, repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(b)(3), 90
Stat. 1520 (1976).
96. For gifts after 1986, a credit (not to exceed $192,000) is allowed against gift tax imposed.
I.R.C. § 2505(a). Because the gift tax imposed on a taxable gift of $600,000 is $192,000, the credit is
equivalent to a gift tax exemption of $600,000.
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interest based on some remote contingency would likely be insignificant. 97
Finally, Leach made the unlikely assumption-he cited no examples-that
an agent would uncover a violation not previously detected. 98
B. Other Assumptions Justifying the Wait-and-see Approach to the
Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities
The case for wait-and-see is premised on other assumptions. These
proffered assumptions do not bear up under scrutiny any better than the
assumption of frequent invalidation.
Assumption #1: The common law Rule significantlyfrustrates the trans-
feror's intent by allowing unintended beneficiaries to obtain property.
Consider a disposition, variations of which are commonly offered by
wait-and-see advocates:
Tdevised property in trust to pay income to childA for life. AfterA's death,
the corpus is to be equally divided among such of A's children as reach 25. T
left the residue of his estate to B. 99
T, a widow, was survived byA who was childless at the time. The remainder
to A's children is void under the common law Rule. The interest passes to B.
In the abstract, it is difficult to quarrel with the point that T's intent has
been frustrated by invalidating the remainder interest. But consider that T's
intent was equivocal-she only wanted her grandchildren to take if they
reached 25. Should we be so concerned with frustrating equivocal intent?
Further, T never knew any of her grandchildren-none had been born
within her lifetime. Should we be so concerned if (1) property will not
reach persons not in existence at the time of the disposition, and (2) a
transferor provides a scheme of distribution in an arbitrary fashion without
regard to the eventual need or status of unborn persons? Arguments for this
kind of dead hand control-which may be frustrated-make little sense
when the power of appointment device is taken into account. 100
97. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Cardeza's Estate, 5 T.C. 202 (1945), aff'd, 173 F.2d 19 (3d Cir.
1949). For the same reason, state gift taxation, applicable in a handful of states, will not be a factor.
98. If a recent ruling is any indication, the likelihood of detection is remote. In Priv. Ltr. Rul.
8234151 (May 23. 1982), the Service erroneously recognized a provision that terminated a trust 21 years
and 11 months after lives-in-being. Under the Rule, actual-not prescribed-periods of gestation are
permissible. See L. SImES & A. SMITH, supra note 17, § 1224.
99. See, e.g., Leach, Perpetuiies in a Nutshell. supra note 22, at 648 (Example 24).
100. As Professor Leach wrote: "The power of appointment is the most efficient dispositive device
that the ingenuity of Anglo-American lawyers has ever worked out." Leach, Powers ofAppointnent. 24
A.B.A. J. 807 (1938).
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Assume in the above example that the age was limited to 21, rather than
age 25. The remainder interest would then have been validly created. If A
died survived by one child, age 3, B would be entitled to the income from
the property for at least 18 years. 10 1 Indeed, if the child died under 21, B
would then be entitled to the trust property. Can it be said that B, who after
A's death would become the owner of the trust property if the disposition
was based on age 25, was really an unintended beneficiary?
By voiding the remote interest, 102 the intended beneficiaries will not take
under the instrument, but this does not mean they will never take. The
"unintended beneficiaries" will probably be the parents of the intended
(and usually) unborn beneficiaries. In turn, the parents will likely pass the
property on to the intended beneficiaries and do so in a less rigid manner
than under the original disposition.
Of course, there may be instances of unintended benefit. The point is that
the assumption is not necessarily correct. 1
03
Assumption #2: The wait-and-see approach to the common law Rule
Against Perpetuities will cause minimal inconvenience, through litigation
or otherwise.
On one level, wait-and-see advocates have effectively put the uncertainty
of waiting to see into perspective. A waiting period is necessary under the
traditional common law Rule approach to see whether the validly-created
interest under the Rule actually vests or terminates during the period.
Accordingly, the uncertainty under wait-and-see is no more objectiona-
ble. 104
a. Inconvenience During the Waiting Period
Professor Casner once contended that, apart from rare cy pres litigation,
litigation will "evaporate, because when you wait and see the interests will
101. In a few states, the minor child of A would be entitled to the interim income by special
legislation. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 733 (West 1954); N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 9-2.3
(McKinney 1967) (income that has not been disposed of passes to "persons presumptively entitled to
the next eventual interest (estate)").
102. Professor Lusky, speaking for the wait-and-see opponents, stated: "Our position is simply
that killing a future interest is not the equivalent of murder." 1978ALIProceedings, supra note 4, at 257
(remarks of Professor Lusky).
103. Cf. Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, supra note 21.
104. See Maudsley, How to Wait and See, supra note 7, at 364-65. Because most dispositions are
in trust, earlier objections to the lack of marketability under wait-and-see will not be pursued in this
article. See Simes, The "Wait andSee" Doctrine, supra note 8, at 188-90. Nordoes there appearto be a
marketability problem under non-trust dispositions. 1978 AL Proceedings, supra note 4, at 273
(remarks of Fairfax Leary, Jr., an A.L.I. member).
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vest in time." 1 05 More recently, Professors Dukeminier and Waggoner have
predicted substantial litigation under wait-and-see methods which require
identification of measuring lives. 106
Professor Waggoner now argues against "traditional" wait-and-see
methods which use actual measuring lives because administrative burdens
will be imposed during the waiting period. 10 7 He notes that, unlike the
common law Rule, these wait-and-see methods require actual tracing of
individuals' lives, deaths, marriages, divorces, births, adoptions in and out
of families and so on. 108 He concludes that "keeping track of and recon-
structing these events to determine the survivor and the time of the sur-
vivor's death imposes an administrative burden wise to avoid."' 1 9 It should
be noted that the attending administrative expenses will diminish the
benefits for the beneficiaries.
Assuming, arguendo, that a period-in-gross (proxy) method will not
entail the administrative burdens identified by Professor Waggoner, will
there be no inconveniences during the waiting period? Will litigation under
a proxy method be unnecessary? Consider the following hypothetical:
In 1987, T devised property in trust to child A for life, remainder to A's
children for life, remainder to A's grandchildren who are alive at the death of
the survivor of A's children. T is survived by A and 3 children (W, X, and Y).
Shortly before dying in 2027, A allegedly fathers child Z. Does Z receive
a share of the income during the trust period? If yes, will trust termination
occur when the survivor of W, X, Y, and Z dies or when the survivor of W, X,
and Y dies? What should the trustee do? I10
At A's death, the trustee would like instructions from a court on whether
Z is entitled to share in the trust, and if so, when will the trust terminate.
Assuming Z is determined to be a child of A, I"' a court might allow Z to
receive income, in part because her inclusion would not violate the com-
mon law Rule Against Perpetuities. 112 But should a court determine
105. 1978 ALl Proceedings, supra note 4, at 249 (remarks of Professor Casner).
106. See supra notes 51, 52 and accompanying text.
107. Waggoner, Perspective, supra note 9, at 1724-25.
108. Waggoner. Progress Report. supra note I, 703.2.
109. Id.
110. A trustee is entitled to instructions from the court regarding such matters as the proper
construction of the instrument and the identity of the trust beneficiaries. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 259 (1959).
11I. Other cases may initially involve adoption questions-adoption out, adoption in. fraudulent
adoption, and equitable adoption. See generally Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association:
Who Should Get What and Why, 37 VND. L. REV. 711 (1984). A recent case. In re Estate of Best, 66
N.Y.2d 151. 485 N.E.2d 1010 (1985). involved born-out-of-wedlock and adoption issues.
112. See L. SimEs & A. SMITH, supra note 17, § 649. Because T made a class gift to A's children.
Z, if determined to fall within the class, should receive income for as long as possible.
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whether the trust will terminate if Z survives her siblings by the half-blood
or should it wait-and-see whether Z actually survives? Assuming a court
should defer construction until the problem actually arises, 113 how should
the court decide the construction issue if Z is the survivor and the children
of W, X, and Y demand distribution? Should a court construe the will-
sometime in the twenty-first century-to limit trust duration to the class of
A's children alive at T's death, or should it allow inclusion of afterborns? If
the court decides that the trust will not terminate until Z dies, deferred cy
pres litigation may be necessary.
In re Estate of Pearson, 114 a 1971 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision,
provides an actual example of litigation under a wait-and-see statute. The
court had to construe Pennsylvania's wait-and-see statute which offered-
and still offers-no guidance on determining the measuring lives. 115 Pro-
fessor Waggoner provided the terms of the testamentary trust and relevant
facts:
The income was to be paid to the testator's brothers and sisters for their lives,
apparently with cross remainders [in income] until the death of the last one;
upon the death of the last surviving brother or sister, the income was to be paid
to the testator's nieces and nephews until the death of the last surviving niece
or nephew; upon the death of the last surviving niece or nephew, the income
was to be paid to the testator's grandnieces and grandnephews until the death
of the last surviving grandniece or grandnephew; and so on [income to
younger generation beneficiaries "as long as there are living legal heirs"]
until there were no more income beneficiaries, at which time the corpus of the
trust was to be delivered to charitable organizations. At his death in 1967, the,
testator was survived by six brothers and sisters, thirteen nephews and nieces,
and twenty-nine grandnephews and grandnieces. 116
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 259 comment c (1959) (no advance instructions on
questions which may never arise).
114. 442 Pa. 172, 275 A.2d 336 (1971).
115. Effective since 1948, the Pennsylvania wait-and-see statute provides:
Rule against perpetuities
(a) General-No interest shall be void as a perpetuity except as herein provided.
(b) Void interest-exceptions-Upon the expiration of the period allowed by the common law
rule against perpetuities as measured by actual rather than possible events any interest not then
vested and any interest to members of a class the membership of which is then subject to increase
shall be void.
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(a) (b) (Purdon 1975).
The statute may apply to interests created before 1948. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(d) (Purdon
1985 Supp.) (as amended, effective June 27, 1978); see Levin, Section 6104(d) ofthePennsvlvania Rule
Against Perpetuities: The Validity and Effect of the Retroactive Application of Property and Probate
Law Reform, 25 VILL. L. REv. 213 (1980).
116. L. WAGGONER, NUTSHELL, supra note 6, at 301-02; Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, supra note
21, at 1764. Portions of Professor Waggoner's Michigan article were adapted from his Nutshell work.
Id. at 1718 n.4.
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Professor Waggoner extensively analyzed Pearson, including the court's
mishandling of the wait-and-see concept. 117 He strenuously objected to the
failure of the court to articulate any standard for determining measuring
lives. He also deplored the court's refusal to decide whether the charities'
remainder interests were initially vested; a finding which would have
resulted in validity under Pennsylvania law. 118 According to Professor
Waggoner, this refusal constituted an "unwarranted extension of the wait-
and-see modification beyond its proper sphere." 119 It also may have cost the
estate a valuable estate tax charitable deduction. 120
Three assumptions will be made about Pearson: (1) the trust was effec-
tive in 1987; (2) the controlling statute was a 90-year proxy version under a
wait-and-see approach; and (3) Pennsylvania's class gift constructional
rules applied. Under these rules, Pennsylvania courts presumably carry out
a testator's intention by including as many persons within a class as
possible. 121
At some point during trust administration, it will be necessary to
determine whether any afterborn nieces and nephews (perhaps unlikely
because of elderly parents) and any afterborn grandnephews and grand-
nieces (most likely) will be beneficiaries under the trust. Further litigation
may be required to identify beneficiaries in even younger generations.
Because the interests of all of these beneficiaries might vest by the year
2077, a court properly applying the wait-and-see concept should refuse to
determine validity before that date. 122 Most likely, some interests in the
trust will not vest by the year 2077. At that time, deferred cy pres litigation
will be necessary- 12 3
In re Frank, 124 a 1978 decision by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, is
another example of litigation under a wait-and-see regime. In Frank, the
court was faced with a construction issue: whether a woman who was
married after, but alive at, trust creation in 1927, was a beneficiary for trust
termination purposes. After noting the retroactive application of Pennsyl-
vania's wait-and-see statute, 25 the court determined that including the
117. L. WAGGONER, NUTSHELL, supra note 6, at 301-23; Waggoner, Perpetuity Refonn, supra note
21, at 1762-76.
118. Pennsylvania's wait-and-see statute does not apply if an interest would not have been subject
to the common law Rule. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(b)(1) (Purdon 1975). See In re Frank. 480 Pa.
116. 389 A.2d 536 (1978) (discussed infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text).
119. L. WAGGONER, NUTSHELL, supra note 6, at 313.
120. See id. at 305. Charitable deductions for transfers in trust after July 31. 1969. must comply
with strict rules. See I.R.C. §§ 2055(e)(2), 2522(c)(2).
121. See McDowell Nat'l Bank v. Applegate, 479 Pa. 300, 388 A.2d 666 (1978).
122. See L. WAGGONER, NUTSHELL, supra note 6, at 303.
123. See infra notes 135-48 and accompanying text.
124. 480Pa. 116, 389 A.2d 536 (1978).
125. See supra note 115.
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woman would not violate the common law Rule Against Perpetuities as
applied to gifts in default of exercising a power of appointment. 126 Frank
raises questions about subsequent constructional cases vis-a-vis both Penn-
sylvania's and other wait-and-see systems. 127
As under other wait-and-see versions, the USRAP will apply only if the
common law Rule is violated. 128 Indeed, wait-and-see advocates have
always acknowledged the necessity for litigation. "[A]s Professor Leach
himself pointed out . . a lawsuit is often necessary to establish that a
traditional perpetuity violation exists . ... 129 In fact, the hypothetical
case and the actual cases of Pearson and Frank suggest that the most
frequently litigated issue under any wait-and-see system will be whether
the common law Rule was violated. 130 In turn, construction cases will be
necessary to determine if persons, typically afterborns, are includable
within a class. 131 If included, the common law Rule may be violated. 132 If
126. Frank was a 4-3 decision. The majority considered the actuality that the woman was alive at
trust creation-an approach not inconsistent with the common law Rule's treatment of gifts in default of
exercising a power under the second-look doctrine. See Sears v. Coolidge, 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E.2d
563, (1952). See supra note 115 (quoting statute). Two of the three dissenters-equating the second-
look doctrine with the wait-and-see approach-objected to a construction which would render the
interest void under the common law Rule as it was understood in 1927. In re Frank, 480 Pa. 116, 389
A.2d at 543-44; accord L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 17, § 1276.
127. Because Frank did not involve a construction which would violate the common law Rule,
applying a wait-and-see approach was not necessary for decision. Cf. infra note 134 and accompanying
text (suggested approach under the USRAP).
128. USRAP § 1 (1986); see DRAFr USRAP (Spring 1986), supra note 1, at 21-51. Professor
Dukeminier, however, advocates eliminating the common law Rule altogether. See infra notes 150 and
256 and accompanying text; accord Maudsley, How to Wait and See, supra note 7, at 370-73.
129. L. WAGGONER, NUTSHELL, supra note 6, at 319.
130. An income tax analogy comes to mind. In 1954, Congress enacted a scholarship provision
(I.R.C. § 117) to end the case-by-case litigation over whether a receipt constituted an excludable gift.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4017, 4041. Since then, the major litigation issue has been whether the receipt constitutes a scholarship
(in effect, a gift) or compensation for services. See Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969), and
progeny of cases. Once a receipt is determined to constitute a scholarship, complex scholarship rules
apply.
131. Tax issues may also arise. For example, assume a beneficiary has a vested remainder interest
but predeceases certain income beneficiaries who take as a class. Although the remainder interest will
be estate taxable, its value effectively depends on when the decedent's successor will obtain possession.
In turn, that question depends on who are the members of the class. Inevitably, the Bosch doctrine
(Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967)) will require federal courts to pass on the
propriety of lower state court decisions. See Note, Bosch and the Binding Effect of State Court
Adjudication Upon Subsequent Federal Tax Litigation, 21 VAND. L. REV. 825 (1968).
Valuation questions may also arise when an executor seeks to defer payment of taxes. See I.R.C.
§ 6163 (extension of time for payment on value of future interests); see also In re Estate of Gunderson,
93 Wn. 2d 808, 613 P.2d 1135 (1980) (complex formula to defer state death taxes).
132. See Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Brody, 174 Conn. 616, 392 A.2d 445 (1978).
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excluded, the preferred result under existing law, there may be no per-
petuities violation. 133 As reporter for the USRAP, Professor Waggoner
expects that courts will incline towards a construction resulting in validity
under the common law Rule. 134
The ultimate impact of litigation during the wait-and-see period will be
diminished benefits for the intended beneficiaries as a result of fees of
lawyers-the unintended beneficiaries. Although the actual size of the
Pearson estate was not disclosed, 6 law firms representing 40 clients were
ordered to be paid from the estate. In Frank, there were 5 law firms
representing various beneficiaries.
b. Inconvenience at the End of the Waiting Period
Most wait-and-see advocates agree on what should happen in the event
that an interest has neither terminated nor vested within whatever waiting
period obtains: deferred cy pres litigation. 135 The transferor's intent will be
carried out as nearly as possible, "thereby holding the unavoidable enrich-
ment of unintended takers to a minimum." 136
The deferred cy pres section under the USRAP provides as follows:
REFORMATION. Upon the petition of an interested person, a court shall
reform a disposition in the manner that most closely approximates the
transferor's manifested plan of distribution and is within the 90 years allowed
by [the statutory rule against perpetuities] if:
(1) a nonvested property interest or a power of appointment becomes invalid
under [the statutory rule];
(2) a class gift is not but might become invalid under [the statutory rule] and
the time has arrived when the share of any class member is to take effect in
possession or enjoyment; or
(3) a nonvested property interest that is not validated by [the statutory rule]
can vest but not within 90 years after its creation. 137
133. See, e.g., Joyner v. Duncan, 299 N.C. 565, 264 S.E.2d 76 (1980). Underwood v.
MacKendree, 242 Ga. 666, 251 S.E.2d 264 (1978). See generally RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 375
(1944).
134. See DRAFT USRAP (Spring 1986), supra note 1, at 46. Litigation during the waiting period
may also be necessary under the USRAP reformation statute. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
136 Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, supra note 21, at 1782.
137. USRAP § 3 (1986).
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In addition to 7 single-spaced pages of discussion of the section including 6
complex examples, the USRAP offers the Restatement (Second) as an
additional reference. 138
The complexity of the deferred cy pres approach can be illustrated by an
example under the above-quoted statute. 139 Although that example suggests
the precise method of reformation, the actual reform ordered by a court will
depend on the transferor's "manifested plan of distribution." This may
include invalidation of the interest, along with invalidation of valid interests
under the doctrine of infectious invalidity. 140 The Restatement (Second)
138. DRA1r USRAP (Spring 1986), supra note 1, at 60-67.
139. Example (3)-Age Contingency in Excess of 21. T devised property in trust, directing the
trustee to pay the income "to A for life, then to A's children; the corpus of the trust is to be equally
divided among A's children who reach the age of 30. T was survived by A, by A's spouse (H), and
by A's two children (X and Y), both of whom were under the age of 30 when T died.
Since the remainder interest in favor of A's children who reach 30 is a class gift, at common law
(Leakev. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817)) and under this Act... the interests
of all potential class members must be valid or the class gift is totally invalid. Although X and Y
will either reach 30 or die under 30 within their own lifetimes, there is at T's death the possibility
that A will have an afterborn child (Z) who will reach 30 or die under 30 more than 21 years after
the death of the survivorof A, H, X, and Y. There is no validating life, and the class gift is therefore
not validated [under the common law Rule] ....
Under [the statutory wait-and-see rule] .... the children's remainder interest becomes invalid
only if an interest of a class member neither vests nor terminates within 90 years after T's death. If
in fact there is an afterborn child (Z), and if upon A's death, Z has at least reached an age such that
he cannot be alive and under the age of 30 on the 90th anniversary of T's death, the class gift is
valid. (Note that at Z's birth it would have been certain that he could not be alive and under the age
of 30 on the 90th anniversary of T's death; nevertheless, the class gift could not then have been
declared valid because, A being alive, it was then possible for one or more additional children to
have later been born to or adopted by A.)
Although unlikely, suppose that at A's death (prior to the expiration of the 90-year period), Z's
age was such that he could be alive and under the age of 30 on the 90th anniversary of T's death.
Suppose further that at A's death X and Y were over the age of 30. Z's interest and hence the class
gift as a whole is not yet invalid under the Statutory Rule because Z might die under the age of 30
within the 90-year period following T's death; but the class gift might become invalid because Z
might be alive and under the age of 30, 90 years afterT's death. Consequently, the prerequisites to
reformation set forth in subsection (2) are satisfied, and a court would be justified in reforming T's
disposition to provide that Z's interest is contingent on reaching the age he can reach if he lives to
the 90th anniversary of T's death. This would render Z's interest valid so far as the Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities is concerned, and allow the class gift as a whole to be declared valid. X and Y
would thus be entitled immediately to their one-third shares each. If Z's interest later vested, Z
would receive the remaining one-third share. If Z failed to reach the required age under the
reformed disposition, the remaining one-third share would be divided equally between X and Y or
their successors in interest.
Id. at 63-65.
140. Courts are urged not to apply the infectious invalidity doctrine. See DRAFr USRAP (Spring
1986), supra note 1, at 61.
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provides that the ultimate impact of death taxes is a relevant factor in fashion-
ing the relief. 141 Despite the lengthy discussions of deferred cy pres under
both documents, neither provides guidance for a court to determine what the
manifested plan of distribution was in a particular case.
Consider existing judicial difficulty in ascertaining the intent (the man-
ifested plan of distribution) of a decedent: "[P]robing the minds of persons
long dead as to what they meant by words used when they walked this earth
in the flesh is, at best, perilous labor." 142 Ascertaining such intent some 90
years after death will be even more perilous. Deferred cy pres will require
judges (who will not likely have been born at the time of the transferor's
death) to divine the manifested plan of distribution and prescribe a scheme
which best approximates that plan. Such a judge will also have to be expert
or become expert in state and federal taxation, because the tax impact will
be a relevant factor.143
Enactment of deferred cy pres legislation will add a class of unintended
beneficiaries: unborn lawyers. The staggering fees Professor Leach com-
plained about may be commonplace in deferred cy pres litigation. '44
For four principal reasons, the response that deferred cy pres litigation
will arise only infrequently is unfounded. First, subsections (2) and (3) of
the reformation statute ensure that litigation will occur well before the
proxy period expires. Under subsection (2), the process can be invoked as
soon as one member of a class could call for distribution.1 45 Second, the
frequency of litigation is mere conjecture. 146 For example, adoptions
(fraudulent or otherwise) which can extend trust duration for a considerable
period are not taken into account. Third, no account is taken of potential
litigation to determine whether the common law Rule was violated; de-
ferred cy pres can be invoked only if the common law Rule was violated. 147
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.5, at 87 (1983) (illustration
8).
142. See North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Goode, 298 N.C. 485, 487, 259 S.E.2d 288, 291 (1979)
(quoting with approval Galing v. Galing, 239 N.C. 215,221, 79 S.E.2d 466,471(1954)).
143. Relevant tax systems may include federal and state transfer tax systems (gift, estate and/or
inheritance and generation-skipping systems), as well as income tax systems.
144. See supra text accompanying note 89.
145. See supra note 139 (example illustrating early litigation). Similarly, early litigation is possible
when a nonvested interest cannot vest within the wait-and-see period. See DRAFT USRAP (Spring 1986).
supra note 1, at 60 (discussing Subsection (3), quoted supra in text accompanying note 137).
146. Professor Casner predicted litigation in no more than 10% of the cases. 1979ALIProceedings.
supra note 4, at 456-57.
147. Courts will have to determine the effect of a prior, but erroneous, decision holding that an
interest violates the common law Rule. See Merrill v. Wimmer, 481 N.E.2d 1294 (Ind. 1985) (discussed
infra text accompanying notes 221-34). In effect, res judicata and related questions will be presented.
Compare Dickerson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 268 Ark. 292, 595 S.W.2d 677 (1980) (no res judicata), with




Fourth, even wait-and-see advocates recognize the likelihood of deferred
cy pres litigation. Both the Restatement (Second) of Property and the
USRAP contain numerous examples-none of them far-fetched-of when
deferred cy pres litigation will be necessary. 148
Assumption #3: The wait-and-see approach to the common law Rule
Against Perpetuities simplifies the law.
A critical flaw in wait-and-see systems is the attendant complexity. 149
Each variation begins with the common law Rule and adds on layers of
complexity.
Professor Dukeminier extols the virtues of the causal relationship princi-
ple because it replaces the what-might-have-been test of the common law
Rule. 150 On analysis, however, it is clear that the common law must first be
understood to identify the measuring lives. 151 Additionally, Professor
Waggoner demonstrates how difficult identifying measuring lives will be
by this method. 152 Professor Dukeminier, however, feels that the courts will
be able to handle any problems: " [T]his gives ... judges too little [credit]
. . I do not doubt that judges can reason just as logically, once they see
that the measuring lives for wait-and-see are the persons you test for a
validating life at common law."' 153 Professor Dukeminier's optimism is not
confirmed by the judicial experience to date. 154
The USRAP adopts a 90-year proxy method, but the wait-and-see
component will not apply if an interest does not violate the common law
Rule. 155 If, as agreed, the common law Rule is not well understood, is it
reasonable to expect that a Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.5, at 81-87 (1983); DRAFT
USRAP (Spring 1986), supra note 1, at 61-67.
149. ProfessorSchuylerobserved: "[I]fsimplicity is a worthypurposeofperpetuityreform, then, on
balance, the game of wait-and-see may be hardly worth the candle." Schuyler, Should the RuleAgainst
Perpetuities Discard Its Vest? (Part II), 56 MICH. L. Rev. 887,941 (1958).
150. Dukeminier, The Measuring Lives, supra note 9, at 1711-13. He would displace the common
law Rule with the following sentence: "No interest is good unless it vests within twenty-one years afterthe
death of all persons in being when the interest is created who can affect the vesting of the interest." Id. at
1713.
151. Dukeminier, Final Comment, supra note 9, at 1747.
152. Waggoner, Perspective, supra note 9, at 1714-24.
153. Dukeminier, Final Comment, supra note 9, at 1747.
154. See, e.g., Merrill v. Wimmer,481 N.E.2d 1294 (Ind. 1985) (discussedinfratextaccompanying
notes 221-34). Professor Volkmerdiscusses three Nebraskacases involving aperpetuities issue which the
court (and attorneys) failed to detect. Volkmer, The Law of Future Interests in Nebraska (Part 1), 18
CREIGHTON L. REv. 259, 278-81 (1985).
155. USRAP § 1 (1986) (discussed supra note 71); see Waggoner, Progress Report, supra note 1,
701.1.
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with an added wait-and-see component will be better understood? Pro-
fessor Waggoner thinks not. Consider his concerns as a result of the
Pearson decision:
It is uncertain how competently the courts will administer the wait and see
modification. In working a fundamental modification of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, the wait and see concept constitutes an enormous disturbance of
settled law in a highly technical and indeed arcane area. . . . IT]he danger
and uncertainty is that some courts, perhaps many courts, operating under a
wait and see regime may misunderstand and misapply the concept. Thus there
is the risk of muddled opinions, and of a decline in the quality of jurispru-
dence in the perpetuity area. To be somewhat more specific, there is even the
risk that the wait and see modification would not be restricted to its proper
sphere-interests which violate the common law Rule in its traditional form.
It would be unfortunate indeed if a court operating under a wait and see
regime were to refuse to adjudge the validity of an interest which was valid
under the traditional possibilities test on the fallacious ground that the new
law requires that we wait to see what actually happens. Raising the spectre of
such a misdirected result, or indeed the danger of misconceived judgments
even if the operation of wait and see is restricted to its proper sphere, might be
dismissed as far-fetched were it not for the fact that the Pearson decision
shows that the danger is real. 156
Professor Waggoner also points to another decision which raised "suspi-
cions about courts' ability to administer wait and see." 157 Notwithstanding
his misgivings, Professor Waggoner would depend on courts to identify
"the various chains of events that will render the interest valid and/or
conversely the various chains of events that will render it invalid." 158
The latest available complete version of the USRAP is a remarkably
complex document. 159 It contains over 80 single-spaced pages. There are
25 complex examples under just one of the sections 16 ---a number which
exceeds the actual invalidating cases during the 8-year period, 1978-1985,
by over 300 percent.
The reader might bear in mind the plight of the legislator who will be
expected to consider the merits of the USRAP. A Kentucky legislator's
response to wait-and-see is instructive: "[T]his is the most complex subject
156. L. WAGGONER, NUTSHELL, supra note 6, at 310-11 (emphasis in original).
157. Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, supra note 21, at 1776 n. 153 (citing Phelps v. Shropshire, 254
Miss. 777, 183 So. 2d 158 (1966), wherein the court confused the wait-and-see doctrine with the common
law severability doctrine).
158. L. WAGGONER, NUTSHELL, supra note 6, at 320. He adds the followingcaveat:"In order forthis
approach to work properly, however, the courts must be able to handle it competently." Id. at 32 1. A proxy
method does not obviate the need to identify chains of events: vesting or termination will still depend on
the individual family situation.
159. DRAFr USRAP (Spring 1986), supra note 1.
160. The example set out supra in note 139 illustrates the type of example under the USRAP.
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ever brought up in the legislature, and I'm not going to vote for something I
don't understand.' 61
Assumption #4: The wait-and-see approach to the common law Rule
Against Perpetuities will not unreasonably extend dead hand control be-
cause it merely adds a standard saving clause to an instrument.
Wait-and-see advocates claim that their system merely introduces a well-
conceived saving clause into an instrument. 162 Consider Professor Casner's
description of wait-and-see: "All this really does is to give a person who has
not had the good fortune of putting himself in skilled hands the opportunity
to have the same benefit."'1 63
Although this argument has egalitarian appeal in the guise of consumer-
protection, it fails to take into account the differences between standard
saving clauses and the saving clause injected into instruments under wait-
and-see. The standard saving clause ensures compliance with the Rule but
usually terminates a trust well before the maximum allowable period. In
contrast, the injected saving clause, especially one based on a 90-year
period as sanctioned by the USRAP, encourages dead hand control and
fosters litigation.
Professor Waggoner uses the saving clause feature to justify a waiting
period of 80 to 100 years.164 He illustrates how a disposition otherwise
violative of the Rule-a disposition conditioned on unborn grandchildren
attaining an age in excess of 21-can be saved. 165 All the drafter need do is
insert a saving clause which will require trust termination 21 years after the
death of the last survivor of a designated group. To assure that young
children will be included, Professor Waggoner suggests a group comprised
of the surviving descendants of the testator's parents or grandparents. 166
Since such a group will likely contain a young child, adding 21 years to the
child's actuarial life expectancy produces a period-in-gross of 80 to 100
years. 167
Professor Waggoner rejects wait-and-see methods which employ actual
measuring lives because of the arbitrariness involved. 168 Instead he urges
adoption of a USRAP based on a proxy method. 169 Under the USRAP,
courts would also utilize the standardized 90-year time period to reform
161. See Dukeminier, Kentucky PerpetuitiesLawRestated andReformed, 49 Ky. L.J. 3,57 (1960).
162. See Dukeminier, The Measuring Lives, supra note 9, at 1656 & n.25.
163. 1979 ALl Proceedings, supra note 4, at 456 (remarks of Professor Casner).
164. Waggoner, Perspectives, supra note 9, at 1718-19.
165. Id. at 1718.
166. Id. at 1718 n.16.
167. Id. at 1719.
168. Id. at 1726-28.
169. Waggoner, Progress Report, supra note 1, 700.
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instruments which prescribe excessive waiting periods; for example, 100 or
125 years. 170
The dead hand control sanctioned by a 90- to 100-year waiting period
would not be objectionable to Professor Waggoner. "Since lawyers operat-
ing within the Common-law Rule can and do provide such an 'over-
insured' period of time for their clients' dispositions to work themselves
out, it is hardly unprincipled for the law to grant a similar period of time to
clients who unbeknownst to them and their families did not have expert
counsel."171
It is appropriate to consider how a competent attorney would actually
approach a perpetuities problem. Assume a client wishes to leave property
in trust with income to her child for life, remainder to unborn grandchildren
provided they reach age 25. The attorney would probably advise against the
disposition: instead, the attorney would suggest that the child be given a
special testamentary power to appoint among her issue, urging that the
child seek counsel when exercising the power. Assuming the client per-
sisted, the lawyer would not knowingly violate the Rule. Rather, he or she
would accomplish the result within the perpetuities period by trying to
convince the client to reduce the age to 21. Alternately, the grandchildren's
interests could be made to vest in interest at 21 with delayed possession
until age 25.172 In any event, the lawyer would use a saving clause to be
absolutely certain of no violation. 73
A survey of various saving clause forms reveals two major types, illus-
trated by the forms of wait-and-see advocates:
Professor Dukeninier's form:
Notwithstanding any other provisions in this instrument, this trust shall
170. The 100-year period-in-gross version provides the following example:
E ramnple (5)-Case ofA nInterest, As of its Creation, Being Impossible to Vest Within the Period of
theStatitorvRide. Tdevised property in trust, directing the trustee todivide the income, perstirpes,
among T's descendants from time to time living, for 125 years. At the end of the 125-year period
followingT's death, the trustee is todistribute the corpus and accumulated income to T's then-living
descendants, per stirpes: if none, to the XYZ Charity.
The nonvested property interest in favorofG's [sic) descendants who are living 125 years afterT's
death can vest, but not within the allowable 100-yearperiod of the Statutory Rule. The interest would
violate the Common-law Rule because there is no common-law validating life. In these circum-
stances, a court is authorized by subsection (3) of this section, [see supra note 1371 to reform T's
disposition within the limits of the Statutory Rule. An appropriate result would be for the court to
lower the period following T's death from a 125-year period to a 100-year period.
DRAFT USRAP(Fall 1985), supra note 57, at44. Cf DRAFt USRAP(Spring 1986). supra note 1, at 66-67
(example of reduction from 100 to 90 years).
171. DRAFr USRAP (Winter 1986), supra note 22, at 20.
172. Cf. In re Estate of Darling. 219 Neb. 705. 365 N.W.2d 821 (1985) (vesting at birth, with
possession postponed until age 25).
173. The competent attorney understands that the Rule is complex: he or she has heeded Professor
Casner's simple solution to avoid a violation See supra text accompanying note 27.
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terminate, if it has not previously terminated, 21 years after the death of the
survivor of the beneficiaries of the trust living at the date this instrument
becomes effective. 174
Professor Casner's form:
If this trust has not terminated within 21 years after the death of the survivor of
my issue living on my death, such trust shall terminate at the end of such 21-
year period ... 175
As suggested by these saving clauses, people tailor dispositions based on
actual family developments rather than on some abstract notion of equal
waiting time. 176
Significantly, saving clauses in practice do not purport to extend dead
hand control for a prolonged period. 177 Instead, they are designed to ensure
compliance with the Rule; they provide for both trust termination and
outright delivery of the property to prescribed persons. 178 Wait-and-see
provides no gift over after the waiting period. 179 Instead, a court must
determine what the transferor (dead for almost 100 years) would have
intended. Further, the property may continue in trust, provided vesting in
interest occurs within the prescribed period.
174. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 841 (3d ed. 1984).
175. 3 A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 1130 (1980).
176. Consider Professor Simes' view: "What period will take care of the normal desires of the
testator who makes a family settlement by way of testamentary trusts? The answer is clear enough. It is
lives in being and twenty-one years." L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 13, at 68-69. See, e.g., Read v.
Legg, 493 A.2d 1013 (D.C. App. 1985) (trust, drafted by expert using saving clause, will terminate after
60 years); Dennis v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 571 F. Supp. 623 (D. R.I. 1983), aff'das
modified, 744 F.2d 893 (1st Cir. 1984) (trust termination, based on saving clause, after 71 years).
177. In addition to Professors Dukeminier's and Casner's forms, see infra text accompanying notes
173, 174, consider the perpetuities saving clauses recommended by Professors Freeland and Maxfield.
See itfra note 178; see also the saving (savings) clauses recommended in the following form books: J.
MURPHY, MURPHY'S WILL CLAUSES, form 1:25 (1985); R. PARELLA &J. MILLER, MODERNTRUSTFORMS &
CHECK-LISTS § 1.3, form 1.3.05 (Ist Supp. 1986); 4 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS,
form 9.22 (1984); R. WILKINS, DRAFTING WILLS ANDTRUSTAGREEMENTS-A SYSTEMS APPROACH, forms
15.20W, 15.21W (rev. ed. 1985).
178. Consider the form recommended by Professors Freeland and Maxfield:
MAXIMUM DURATION OF TRUST
(Avoiding Rule Against Perpetuities)
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the trusts created hereunder shall terminate not
later than twenty-one years after the death of the last to die of those beneficiaries who were living on
the date of my death. At the end of such period all such trusts shall terminate and my Trustee shall
distribute the undistributed income and principal ofsuch trusts to thecurrent income beneficiaries in
the proportions as they are then receiving the income therefrom and if the proportions are not
specified, in equal shares to such beneficiaries, absolute and free of trust.
J. FREELAND, G. MAXFIELD & C. EARLY, FLORIDA WILL ANDTRUSTMANUAL C-97 (2d ed. 1984); see also
forms cited supra note 177.
179. Professor Dukeminier recognizes this shortcoming. Dukeminier, The Measuring Lives, supra
note 9, at 1656 n.25.
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If states adopt the USRAP, a 90-year period will likely become the
standard in practice.180 The English experience bears noting. There, law-
yers commonly used a royal lives saving clause to prolong the waiting
period to the maximum extent possible.' 8' A Law Reform Committee
recommended adoption of a fixed period of 80 years to attract drafters away
from the royal lives approach, but rejected an automatic 80-year period
under its wait-and-see system: "[Y]et we do not think that such a period
should automatically apply to all limitations, for if it did the period during
which it would be necessary to 'wait and see' whether a limitation is valid
might in many cases be undesirably extended."'182 The English cases since
1964 suggest that practitioners are using the 80-year option. 183
The extension of dead hand control is objectionable. Consider Professor
Powell's concerns:
Personally, I believe such a lengthening of the term substantially emasculates
the whole salutary purpose of the Rule, namely to restrict the power of the
dead hand . . . . To the extent that the wait-and-see rule, in fact, emascu-
lates the rule, I believe it to be to that extent socially bad. 184
Professor Fetters voiced his concerns: "To select the outer limits ... as
the standard measure makes about as much sense as fixing automobile
speed limits at just one mile per hour under that speed which statistically is
determined to be involved in the greatest percentage of fatal automobile
accidents."' 85 As a wait-and-see advocate, Professor Dukeminier's views
are significant:
But in reforming the Rule, reformers should keep clearly in view the primary
purpose of the Rule: curtailing the dead hand. The measuring lives for wait-
and-see should be carefully limited lest the reform yield too much ground to
dead hand control. The wait-and-see saving clause should be no broader than
necessary or appropriate in the specific case. 186
The USRAP's deferred cy pres component will also extend dead hand
control. This will likely happen by default.187 Unless there is a sufficient
180. See supra note 71 (setting forth Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities under the USRAP).
181. ENGLISH REPORT. supra note 13, at 6. Leedale v. Lewis, 1980 S.T.C. 679 (Ch.). provides an
example of a royal lives clause: The Perpetuity Day' means the day on which expires the period of twenty-
one years calculated from and after the death of the last survivor of the descendants of His late Majesty
King George the Fifth living at the date of this Settlement.
182. ENGLISH REPORT, supra note 13, at 7.
183. See, e.g.. Watson v. Holland, [1985] 1 All E.R. 290 (Ch. 1984): see also Re Clore [19851 1
W.L.R. 1290 (Ch.) (vesting date was the earlier of 80 years or 20 years after survivor of royal lives).
184. Powell Memorandum, supra note 10, at 136.
185. Fetters, The Vait-and-see Disaster. supra note 8, at 404.
186. Dukemmler. The Measuring Lives, supra note 9, at 1710.
187. Professor Waggoner suggests extension by default under the causal-lives method. Waggoner,
Progress Report. supra note 1, 4 703.3.
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amount of property involved, lawyers are not going to involve themselves
in the process. Assuming the reformation process is worthwhile for law-
yers, the litigation process may last for several years, further extending
dead hand control. 188
In the final analysis, Americans have not deemed it appropriate to take
"full advantage of the rule againstperpetuities." 189 This reasonable restraint
is why there is presently little concern in this country over dead hand control.
Assumption #5: The wait-and-see approach to the common law Rule
Against Perpetuities is consumer-protection legislation for the average
consumer of legal services.
Wait-and-see advocates portray their system as being designed for the
smaller estates. Professor Leach explained:
The technicalities of the Rule against Perpetuities are well known to the estate
specialists who are found in the large law firms which more often serve clients
with large estates; these specialists have less difficulty in avoiding the tech-
nicalities and carrying out their clients' wishes. However, it is more difficult
for the general practitioner, who often serves the small property owner, to
keep abreast of the intricacies of the Rule against Perpetuities while carrying
on the many other types of law practice in which he engages. This. . . [wait-
and-see doctrine] tends to put the nonspecialist on a par with the specialist
and thereby to protect the small-to-moderate property owner who consults the
general practitioner. 190
Professor Leach's subsequent views provide an interesting contrast:
I daresay that the stratospheric level of the Massachusetts Bar is as
sophisticated in perpetuities matters as one is likely to find, but the record is
replete with instances in which its members have fallen fiat. on their distin-
guished faces with regard to trusts involving huge fortunes of our most
prominent citizens. 191
188. Cf. May v. Hunt, 404 So. 2d 1373 (Miss. 1981) (eight years of litigation).
189. 1979 AL Proceedings, supra note 4, at 456 (remarks of Professor Casner). Of course, an
occasional transferorutilizes the full measure of theperiod. See, e.g., Klughv. United States, 588 F.2d45
(4th Cir. 1978) (1881 will, final disposition in 1988); Estate of Tower, 323 Pa. Super. 235,470 A.2d 568
(1983), aff'd, 506 Pa. 642,487 A.2d 820 (1984) (1889 will, final disposition not likely before twenty-first
century).
190. W. LEAcH & 0. TUDOR, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPErurne 228 (1958). Professor Dukeminier
agreed:
My experience in reading hundreds of perpetuities cases tends to confirm Professor Leach's view. I
have not yet found a trust or will of a Ford or Rockefeller or Mellon that violated the Rule against
Perpetuities; violations usually occur in instruments prepared by lawyers of ordinary skills. Since
the Rule is seldom violated by specialists handling huge sums of wealth, the wait-and-see doctrine
will have minimal impact on increasing the amount of property subject to the powerof the dead hand.
Dukeminier, Cleansing the Stables ofProperty:A RiverFoundAtLast, 65 IOWA L. REv. 151,162 (1979).
191. Leach, Perpetuities: What Legislatures, Courts andPractitioners Can Do About the Follies of
the Rule, 13 U. KAN. L. Rev. 351, 356 n. 16 (1965) [hereinafter Leach, Legislatures].
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Recent cases also suggest that perpetuities issues may arise in substantial
estates. 192
Rather than benefiting the average consumer, wait-and-see legislation
will likely benefit the wealthy consumer of legal services. Indeed, if the 90-
year period-in-gross version of the USRAP is widely adopted, the estate
planning bar will likely encourage their wealthy clients to prolong the
duration of trusts to obtain tax benefits. 193 Nor will the deferred cy pres
component of wait-and-see benefit the average consumer of legal services.
Unless there is a sufficient amount involved, it is unlikely that some unborn
lawyer will undertake to immerse him or herself in the arcane world of
perpetuities.
Finally, a system which shields lawyers for less than competent practices
is hardly consumer-protection legislation. Assuming, arguendo, that most
interests will vest or terminate within the waiting period, the lawyer who
drafted the instrument will escape any consequences for violating the
common law Rule. 194 Incompetent lawyers should not be shielded.
Although attorneys may not be expected to master the Rule,195 it is a
192. See Wing v. Wachovia Bank& Ti ust Co.,35 N.C. App. 346,241S.E.2d 397. cert. denied, 295
N.C. 95, 244 S. E.2d 263 (1978) (involving over 60 named parties represented by six law firms): see also
May v. Hunt, 404 So. 2d 1373, 1381 (Miss. 1981) (Sugg, J., dissenting); First Ala. Bank v. Adams. 382 So.
2d 1104 (Ala. 1980) (substantial amount of property).
193 Favorable tax treatment may be secured while property is in trust. See Bloom, The Generation-
Skipping Loophole: Narrowed, But Not Closed, by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 53 WASH. L. REV. 31
( 1977) (discussing prior law). As under prior law, generation-skipping transfer tax can be postponed by
prolonging trusts. 1. R.C. §§ 2601-2663. as enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.99 Pub. L. No. 514.
§ 1431100 Stat. - ( 1986). Professor Casner explained why the Rule Against Perpetuities appears as
the first topic in the Restatement (Second) of Property:
I think it is important to note that the subject of donative transfers in property really is the foundation
of the subject of estate planning, which is a term that is quite popular these days, and there are a great
many people concerned about a program of appropriate estate planning. You really cannot work
effectively in the field of estate planning without noting the limitations that you are operating under
from the standpoint of property law, which is the basis of the entire subject. Therefore. as we develop
this topic, we will from time to time examine it in the light ofestate planning problems. which inject
into the picture a considerable amount of taxation, income, gift, and estate taxes.
1978 ALl Proceedings, supra note 4. at 222-23 (remarks of Professor Casner). In effect, estate planners
concerned with minimizing taxes for their clients-those with significant wealth-must understand the
interplay of the Rule Against Perpetuities. See generally Bloom, Transfer TaxAvoidance: Thelmpact of
Perpetuities Restrictions Before andAfter Generation-Skipping Taxation, 45 ALB. L. REv. 261 (1981).
194. Presumably it would not be malpractice to violate the common law Rule under a wait-and-see
system.
195. In the famous case ofLucas r. Hamm, the California Supreme Court held it was not malpractice
to violate the Rule. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 5 Cal. Rptr. 82 1. cert. denied 368 U.S. 987 (196 ). But
see Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349,530 P.2d 589.118 Cal. Rptr. 621(1975): Wright v. Williams. 47 Cal,
App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr 194 (1975) (suggesting less tolerance for a perpetuities drafting violation).
Even if a violation by a drafting attorney would constitute malpractice, in at least one state an action may
not be maintained by disappointed beneficlaires under a will. See Johnston, Avoiding Malpractice Claims
ThatArise Out of Common Estate Planning Situations, 63 TAXES 780. 783-85 (1985) (discussing privity
barrier in Nebraska and possibly New York). On the other hand, Iowa courts apparently recognize a
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simple matter to avoid a violation by using a saving clause. Society should
not protect the lawyer who does not know enough to use a saving clause. 196
If such a lawyer can fail in this area, it is likely his or her services generally
may not be of much value to the average consumer of legal services.
Assumption #6: There is a correct version of the wait-and-see approach
to the common law Rule Against Perpetuities.
Several versions of wait-and-see have been advanced in recent years. In
1983, Professor Waggoner urged the adoption of the wait-and-see version
malpractice action, but, incredibly, require discovery of the error by lay persons within the applicable
limitations period. Millwright v. Romer, 322 N.V.2d 30 (Iowa 1982). Romeris criticized in Kurtz, supra
note 48, at 754 n. 149. Professor Dukeminier suggests the Romer decision motivated Iowa to adopt its
wait-and-see system. See Dukeminier, The Measuring Lives, supra note 9, at 1656 n.23.
196. Consider the words of Professor Casner: "Nobody who drafts a trust today, familiar with the
rule against perpetuities would think of putting in a trust that did not have.., an overall termination
provisions [sic] in it." 1978 ALI Proceedings, supra note 4, at 240. If, after all the attention generated,
lawyers and law students do not know about saving clauses, additional publicity could be considered. Bar
associations could distribute publicity to their members. Law professors should ensure that their students
know that the Rule need never be violated.
Some commentators have argued that the use of saving clauses is inappropriate. See, e.g., Becker,
Understanding theRuleAgainstPerpetuitiesinRelation to theLawyer'sRole-To Construe or Construct,
20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 733, 759 n.51 (1983). Professor Becker was concerned about possible deviant
distribution of principal, for example, distribution of principal which excludes grandchildren. This
problem, based on the indiscriminate use of saving clauses, can be avoided by a well-conceived "gift
over." Consider Professor Halbach's comment in a widely-disseminated form book:
The purpose of this [gift over] provision of the saving clause is to provide for an alternative
distribution if the cutoff provision terminates the trust before the main provision for distribution
becomes operative. It is a difficult provision to draft because it must be adapted to the dispositive
scheme of each trust and approximate the original as closely as possible.
Halbach, Rule Against Perpetuities, in CALIFORNIA WILL DRAFTING PRACTICE § 12.52, at 577 (1982).
In short, there should be no "deviant distribution of principal" if the transferordesignates the benefici-
aries of the "gift over." The choices are numerous. See generally McGovern, Perpetuities Pitfalls and
How Best to Avoid Them, 6 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 155, 175-77 (1971); Moore, NewHorizons in the
Grant and Exercise ofDiscretionary Powers, 15 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 600 (1981).
Professor Becker also expressed concern over premature irust termination; specifically, termination
while nonbeneficiary children were still alive. Again, the problem can be avoided by discriminate use of
saving clauses. Consider Professor Halbach's form and comment thereto:
Cutoff provision
Any trust created by this Will, orby the exercise of any powerof appointment conferred by this
will, that has not terminated sooner shall terminate twenty-one (21) years after the death of the last
survivorof- [name ordescribe class of those best suited to be measuring lives]- living at
my death.
COMMENT:
The will drafter should choose the group of measuring lives that best suits the particular situation.
Halbach, RuleAgainst Perpetuities, inCALIFORNIA WILLDRAPTnNG PRAcTICE§ 12.52,at575-76(1982).
Professor Simes argued against saving clauses, recommending instead that an attorney be sure there
was no violation. L. SIMEs &A. SMrrH, supra note 17, § 1295. However laudable this ideal, practitioners
will use saving clauses. The attorney's obligation is to design a well-conceived clause appropriate for the
particular situation.
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of the Restatement (Second) of Property: "[Llegislatures contemplating
perpetuity reform should ... enact wait-and-see statutes modeled on the
Restatement (Second)." 197 During the years 1985 and 1986, Professor
Waggoner authored at least four USRAP drafts, including a Restatement
(Second) version and three different proxy versions. 198
In January, 1986, the debate between Professors Dukeminier and Wag-
goner was published. 199 Although Professor Waggoner raised the proxy
method therein, Professor Dukeminier did not respond to it. After 100
pages of debate, Professor Dukeminier, who advocates a causal-lives
method, concluded: "I am more convinced than ever that my proposed
perpetuities reform statute is the simplest, most understandable, and most
easily workable statute yet suggested. '20 0
Assumption #7: There is a need for a uniform statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities.
A clear diversity among the states regarding their approach to dead hand
control is evident. 20 At one extreme is Louisiana which generally requires
beneficiaries to be in existence at the time of transfer. 20 2 The other extreme
is represented by the states of Idaho, South Dakota, and Wisconsin which
197. Waggoner. Perpetuity Reform, supra note 21, at 1785.
198. DRAvrUSRAP(Summer 1985), supra note43 (Restatement (Second) version); DRAFTUSRAP
(Fall 1985), supra note 57; DRAFT USRAP (Winter 1986), supra note 22; DRAFT USRAP (Spring 1986).
supra note 1. In addition, Professor Waggoner developed further variations on the proxy method. See
supra notes 62, 63.
199. See supra note 9.
200. Dukeminier, Final Comment, supra note 9, at 1746.
201. In addition to some rule against perpetuities to limit remote vesting, states may have related (but
varying) rules limiting dead hand contr6l. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1(a)
(McKinney 1967 & 1986 Supp.) (rule against unduly suspending the power of alienation): MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 501.11(6) (West 1947) (trust duration rule); ALA. CODE § 35-4-252 (1977) (very restrictive
accumulation rule). See generally L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 17, §§ 1461-1491.
202. Louisiana operates under a prohibited substitution rule. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1520 (West
Supp. 1986). As the Supreme Court of Louisiana recently noted: "The purpose of the prohibition is to
prevent attempts to tie up property in perpetuity." Succession of Goode, 425 So. 2d 673, 677 n.5 (La.
1982). The principal non-trust exception to the prohibited substitution rule sanctions a usufruct-naked
ownership disposition. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. § 1522 (West 1965). This arrangement is roughly equivalent
to a life estate-remainder arrangement. See 5A R. POWELL, s'upra note 10, C 817. Indeed, the naked owner
must be alive on the date of disposition. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1482 (West 1965).
Trust beneficiaries must usually be alive when a trust is created. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1803 (West
1965 & Supp. 1986). In rare cases, one or more of the settlor's descendants who are alive when the
principal beneficiary dies may be substitute beneficiaries. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1975, 9:1978 (West
Supp. 1986). Special rules govern "class trusts." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1891-9:1906 (West 1965 &
Supp. 1986). See generally Oppenheim, A New Trust Codefor Louisiana-Act 338 of 1964, 39 TuL. L.
REV. 187,208-16 (1965).
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effectively do not restrain dead hand control. 20 3 In between are a majority
of states which rely on the common law Rule exclusively; that is, states
which have not adopted some wait-and-see method. 204 Finally, there are
wait-and-see jurisdictions: states which have adopted limited wait-and-
see;205 and states which have adopted full wait-and-see, 206 including Iowa,
which effectively adopted the Restatement (Second) position.20 7
203. IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 43-5-6 (rev. ed. 1983); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 700.16(5) (West 1981). Itis truethat South Dakota and Wisconsinrestrict theunduesuspension of
the power of alienation. Wts. STAT. ANN. § 700.16(1)(a) (West 1981 &Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 43-5-1 (1983). For dispositions in trust, however, there will be no suspension problem if the
trustee has the powerto sell the trust property. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.16(3) (West 1981); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 43-5-4 (1983). Idaho has no suspension rule forpersonalty. IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1979).
204. Alabama (ALA. CODE § 35-4-4 (1977)); Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-261 (1974));
Arkansas (ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 19); California (CAL. Ctv. CODE 99 715.5-715.7 (Deering 1971));
District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-302 (1981)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 44-6-1 (1982));
Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-4-1 (Bums Supp. 1985)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 26.49(1) (Callaghan rev. ed. 1984)); Missouri (Mo. REv. STAT. § 442.555 (1965 Supp.)); Montana
(MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-1-408 (1985)); New York (N.Y. EPTL § 9-1.1(b)(McKinney 1967)); North
Carolina (N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 34); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-27 (1978)); Oklahoma
(OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 75, 76 (West Supp. 1985)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-5-112
(1980)); Texas (TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.043 (Vernon 1984)); Wyoming (WYO. STAT. § 34-1-138
(republished ed. 1977)). The following states apply the common law Rule in the absence of statutory
provisions: Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Minnesota (only personalty), Nebraska, New Jersey,
Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia.
Several of these states have codified refinements of the Rule. See, e.g., infra note292 (cy pres statutes).
California has an alternate 60-year period. CAL. CtV. CODE § 715.6 (Deering 1971). See generally L.
SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 17, §§ 1411-1439.
205. Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-95 (West 1981)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
33, § 101 (1978)); Maryland (MD. EST. &TRusTs CODE ANN. § 11-103 (1974)); Massachusetts (MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 184A, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1977)). Florida also appears in this category, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 689.22 (WestSupp. 1986). SeePowell, Florida'sStatutoryRuleAgainstPerpetuities, I I FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 767, 810 (1984).
206. The following states clearly employ the causal-lives method: Alaska (ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.27.010(1985)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972));Nevada(
NEv. REV. STAT. § 111.103 (1985)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-1-17.1 (Supp. 1985)); Rhode
Island (R.I. GEN. LAWs § 34-11-38 (1984)).
The wait-and-see method is unclear in the following states: Mississippi (judicially adopts wait-and-
see); New Hampshire (judicially adopts wait-and-see); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(Baldwin
Supp. 1984)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27 § 501(1975)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.1 (Supp.
1985)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.130 (Supp. 1986) (trusts only)). See generally
Dukeminier, The Measuring Lives, supra note 9, at 1658-59 n.30. Uncertainty also exists in Pennsyl-
vania. See supra text accompanying notes 114-27. Illinois has a unique system applicable only for trusts.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, 191-196 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) See Schuyler, Should the Rule Against
Perpetuities Discard Its Vest, 56 MICH. L. REV. 683,714-15 (1958).
Professor Dukeminier also discusses wait-and-see adoptions outside the United States. Dukeminier,
TheMeasuringLives, supranote9, at 1655, 1658 n.29. SeegenerallyL. SIMES &A. SMITH, supra note 17,
§ 1411. England's complex wait-and-see system is comprehensively treated in Professor Maudsley's
work. R. MAuDSLEY, THE MODERN Law, supra note 41, at 110-95.
207. IowA CODE ANN. § 558.68 (West Supp. 1985) (discussed in Kurtz, supra note 48).
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Wait-and-see advocates have called for a uniform statute for over 30
years. 208 If one had been adopted in 1979, the much-maligned Restatement
(Second) method would have been employed. 20 9 Is there any reason to
suspect that any state, let alone a significant number of states, will adopt a
USRAP based on a proxy approach? No, because dead hand rules, or the
lack of them, are not creating any real problems in this country. 210 The cost
of enactment is not worth the effort. 21'
Ultimately, a USRAP is unnecessary. Even if adopted, the USRAP
would not apply to interests created before individual state enactment. 212 In
light of the recent publicity generated by the USRAP, it is doubtful whether
lawyers will draft new instruments without inserting an appropriate saving
clause. 213 Adoption of this complex system to deal with the isolated
violations by transferors not seeking counsel, 214 and with counsel who
persist in violating the Rule, cannot be justified. All violations can be
handled under refinement techniques. 215
IV. REFINING THE COMMON LAW RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES
A. Justification
The paucity of cases holding a nonvested interest void under the common
law Rule demonstrates that the Rule is not producing harsh consequences.
For this and the other reasons discussed in part I1, a wait-and-see system
cannot be justified. Nonetheless, the common Law rule can be refined.
Areas which need refinement are suggested by recent cases in the
perpetuities area. The few cases which correctly found a violation disclose
208. See Leach, Legislatures, supra note 191, at 523.
209. To put it mildly. Professor Dukeminier takes a dim view ofthe A.L. .- recommended solution in
the Restatement (Second):
What Professor Percy Bordwell said of volumes I and 2 of the First Restatement of Property
[Bordwell, Book Review, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 565.570 (1938)]. applies with particular force to the list
of measuring lives in the Second Restatement: "Legislation is legislation and scholarship is schol-
arship, but the Institute is not a legislature and its ways are not those of scholarship."
Dukeminier, The Measuring Lives, supra note 9, at 1680-81.
210. Professor Leach noted that the absence of restrictions on dead hand control has posed no
significant problems in Wisconsin. Leach, Hail Peins'vvania, supra note 19, at 1141.
211. Adoption of the USRAP would also require states to repeal or modify conflicting ancillary
rules. See supra note 201 (identifying related rules).
212. See supra text accompanying note 67.
213. See supra note 196.
214. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 268 Ark. 292,595 S.W.2d 677 (1980) (holographic
will).
215. See infra Part IV.
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familiar traps: the unborn widow situation;216 inclusion of afterborns
within a class;217 and failing to attain an age in excess of 21 years.218 There
were no fertile octogenarian or administrative contingency cases during the
period 1978-1985.219 There were also two violations on exercising a power
in favor of persons who were not alive when the power was created.
220
Because it is assumed that the transferors and powerholders do not intend to
violate the Rule, but merely fall into some trap, refinement to avoid
invalidity would be appropriate.
Refinement is also justified to address the problem of litigation which
erroneously invalidates an interest under the Rule. The recent Indiana case
of Merrill v. Wimmer221 illustrates how the common law Rule can befuddle
bench and bar alike. The case involved the validity of a residuary trust
created under the 1970 will of Newell Merrill (testator). The disposition
may be summarized as follows:
Income to testator's three named children, A, B, and C, for the duration of
the trust. When testator's youngest grandchild reaches age 25, the trust shall
terminate as to two-thirds of the corpus and be divided as follows: one-sixth to
A; one-sixth to A's children; one-sixth toB; and one-sixth to B's children. The
other one-third shall continue in trust with income to C for life and on his
death one-sixth to C's bodily issue and one-sixth to testator's grandchildren
living at trust termination or the entire one-third to testator's grandchildren
living at trust termination if C leaves no bodily issue.
Testator was survived by the following persons: a widow who was not
provided for under the will; 222 his three children (A, B, and C) who were in
216. Dickerson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 268 Ark. 292, 595 S.W.2d 677 (1980) (holographic will).
217. ConnecticutBank&TrustCo. v. Brody, 174Conn. 616,392A.2d445 (1978). This disposition
could have been construed to avoid invalidity. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
218. Walkerv. Bogle, 244 Ga. 439,260 S.E.2d 338(1979); Berry v. UnionNat'l Bank, 164W.Va.
258,262 S.E.2d 766 (1980), was a trust duration case in which the court reduced the period to 21 years.
219. See Nelson v. Kring, 225 Kan. 499, 592 P.2d 438 (1979); Commerce Union Bank v. Warren
County, No. 85-12-I1 (D. Tenn. May 16,1985),rev'd, 707 S.W.2d 854 (1986), involvingthevoiding of an
executory interest if a designated charity ceased existence. USRAP drafts suggest that such transactions
should be subject to a40,yearvesting rule. See, e.g., DRAFrUSRAP (Spring 1986), supra note 1, at 84-86
(relating to possibilities ofreverter, rights ofreentry and certain executory interests in realty). The40-year
rule, however, was dropped from the adopted USRAP version. See UNt. STATUTORY R. AGAINST PER-
PEr nEs (Discussion Draft July 31, 1986).
On appeal in 1986, Commerce UnionBankwas reversed, 707 S.W.2d 854 (1986). The Supreme Court
of Tennessee construed the testamentary trust as creating a possibility of reverter, ratherthan an executory
interest. As a result, it held that the common law Rule was not violated because the Rule does not apply to
possibilities of reverter. See generally L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 17, § 1239.
220. SeelnreWillofGrunebaum, 122Misc. 2d645,471N.Y.S.2d513 (1984);InreHarden, N.Y.L.
J., Sept. 17, 1985, at 13, col. 6 (N.Y. Co. Surr.).
221. 481 N.E.2d 1294 (Ind. 1985), vacating 453 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
222. The decisions do not discuss the spouse's elective share rights. See IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-3-1
(Bums Supp. 1985).
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their mid-to-late 40's; and seven grandchildren (five children of A, ages 13
to 29, and two children of B, ages 11 and 18).
Merrill was litigated in three courts. In the unreported trial decision, 223
the court adopted a probate commissioner's findings that the corpus dis-
positions to A and B and their children violated the Rule Against Per-
petuities, 224 but that the dispositions to C with remainder over did not. A
and B were each awarded one-third of the trust corpus. On appeal, counsel
conceded that the intended corpus distributions to A, B, and their children
violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. The three appellate judges agreed
that the dispositions to C and remainders over did not violate the Rule.225
The appellate court announced it would apply the cy pres doctrine to
violations under the Rule. 226 Pursuant to this judicially-created power, the
court construed the trust beneficiaries as those grandchildren living at
testator's death.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, five justices participating, reversed and
remanded. In the process, however, the court addressed the alleged per-
petuities violation:
The trial court ... correctly held that the trust provisions as to the two-
thirds (2/3) share designated for [A and B] and their children were invalid
under the rule (statute) against perpetuities. . . .The Court of Appeals also
correctly held that trust provisions violated the statute against perpetuities. 227
The Supreme Court of Indiana also suggested that the doctrine of
infectious invalidity would invalidate the dispositions to C and others
because "they are so interrelated with those for [A and B] that they cannot
be permitted to stand alone, because such would result in significant
distortion or defeat of the Testator's underlying objectives. 228 This state-
ment, however, is only dictum because the Court found that the one-third
share to C and the takers after his death violated the Rule. Why? According
to the court, the testator intended that this one-third share not be created
until after termination of the two-thirds share, when the youngest grand-
child reached 25.229 The end result was total invalidation of the trust with
223. The results of the trial court decision were discussed in the intermediate appellate court opinion.
224. Indiana has codified the common law Rule as follows:
TIME IN WHICH AN INTEREST IN REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY MUST VEST.-An interest in property
shall not be valid unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one [21] years after a life or lives in
being at the creation of the interest. It is the intention by the adoption ofthis chapterto make effective
in Indiana what is generally known as the common law rule against perpetuities.
IND. CODE ANN. 32-1-4-1 (Burns Supp. 1985).
225. Merrill v. Wimmer, 453 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. App. 1983).
226. Id. at 361-62.
227. Merrill v. Wimmer, 481 N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (Ind. 1985).
228. Id. at 1299.
229. The court acknowledged the "perplexing" effect of the trust: testator's children could not enjoy
the corpus because the trust would not terminate until after their deaths. Id. at 1298 n. 1. 1300.
Vol. 62:23 1987
Perpetuities Refinement
the property passing by intestacy to A, B, and C.2 30
Merrill was erroneously decided under the common law Rule. The
corpus dispositions to A, B, and their children did not violate the common
law Rule. The dispositions to A and B were indefeasibly vested from
testator's death; the dispositions to their children would necessarily vest at
the deaths ofA and B. 231 Further, the disposition to C for life was good since
C was a life in being and, in fact, his interest would terminate on his death.
Additionally, the disposition to C's bodily issue was good since they would
be determined by C's death. The only disposition violating the common
law Rule, based on the construction that the trust would not terminate until
the youngest grandchild reached 25, was the contingent remainder to the
grandchildren surviving trust termination. 232 Only that Contingent re-
mainder interest should have passed by intestacy, presuming the doctrine of
infectious invalidity would not have required any further invalidation.
The key error made by the trial judge, probate commissioner, eight
appellate judges, and countless lawyers was in assuming that a violation
exists if a trust could last beyond the perpetuities period. Properly under-
stood, the Rule Against Perpetuities deals with future interests which may
vest remotely and not the duration of vested interests in trust. 233 Other
courts have made this distinction and have upheld initially vested interests
230. In the process, the Indiana court declined to modify dispositions violative of the Rule Against
Perpetuities:
The power or function of the court is limited to the construing of a will, that is, the interpretation of
the language used by the testator, and it may not make or rewrite the will for the testator under the
guise of construction, even to do equity or accomplish a more equitable division of the estate, or for
the purpose of making it more liberal and just, oreven though interested parties are agreeable thereto.
So the courts have no right to vary or modify the terms of a will, or to reform it, even on grounds of
mistake, accident, or surprise ....
Id. at 1299 (quoting 95 C.J.S. Wills § 586).
231. A, B, and theirchildren wereready to take wheneverthe preceding estateofA andB terminated,
i.e., when the youngest grandchild reached 25. In effect, there was no condition that these beneficiaries
survive trust termination. The discredited "divide-and-pay-over rule"-a condition of survival implied
until trust termination-was not discussed in the opinions. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 260 (1944);
L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 17, §§ 657-658.
232. After the intermediate appellate court's decision, the following discussion of Merrill appeared:
The last provision is the only one that states a condition of survival and so would be invalid if the
youngest grandchild should be afterborn. All the other interests vest immediately or at birth of a
grandchild, and that must be within the lifetime of the children-clearly valid. The courts did not
construe it that way.
Mortland, New fiduciary decisions, I I EST. PLAN. 56 (1984).
There are, of course, other conditions besides surviving until a certain time which may render an
interest nonvested. See, e.g., L. SiMEs &A. SMrrH, supra note 17, § 141 (enumerating various conditions
rendering a remainder interest contingent).
233. See L. SIMES & A. SMmTH, supra note 17, § 1391; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Do-
NATIvE TRANSFERS) § 2.1 (1983); DRAFr USRAP (Spring 1986), supra note 1, at 87-90. See generally
Downing, The Duration and Indestructibility of Private Trusts, 16 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 350 (1965).
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or interests which would vest (or fail to vest) within the perpetuities period,
despite possession being delayed beyond the perpetuities period. 234
Refinement is also indicated by those American cases-approximately
20 during the eight-year period, 1978 to 1985-which found no per-
petuities violation. These fit into various categories: upholding or con-
struing a saving clause,235 declaring an interest valid which could not
conceivably be invalid under the Rule, 236 and construing a document to
prevent a violation. 237
Litigation upholding a saving clause seems unnecessary. Virtually every
American case considering the question has upheld a saving clause. In
Hagemann v. National Bank & Trust Co., 238 however, the court held that a
clause did not save a violation despite a requirement for trust termination
within the period. The court objected to the gift over component of the
clause, a provision for the same beneficiaries who would have taken if the
trust terminated after the period. But if an interest must vest-indeed
become possessory-within the perpetuities period because of a saving
clause, dead hand control will not extend too far.
The reason for much of the validating (and invalidating) litigation lies in
the operation of the Rule. A violation will enable other parties to succeed to
the interest. Thus, an attack is encouraged. If the attack is successful,
Merrill suggests that, under the doctrine of infectious invalidity, valid
interests or even the trust may be voided.239
234. See, e.g., May v. Hunt, 404 So. 2d 1373, 1375 (Miss. 198 1) ("Citing the elementary principle
that the rule against perpetuities does not apply to vested interests .. "); Burt v. Commercial Bank &
Trust Co., 244 Ga. 253,260 S.E.2d 306(1979) (overruling Burton v. Hicks, 220 Ga. 29,136 S.E.2d 759
(1964)).
235. Norton v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust, 253 Ga. 596, 322 S.E.2d 870 (1984); In re Estate of
Schmitz, 214 Neb. 28, 332 N.W.2d 666 (1983); First Nat'l Bank v. Hampson, 88 111. App. 3d 1057,410
N.E.2d 1109 (1980); First Ala. Bank v. Adams, 382 So. 2d 1104 (Ala. 1980).
236. Cotham v. First Nat'l Bank, 287 Ark. 167, 697 S.W.2d 101 (1985);In re Estate of Darling, 219
Neb. 705,365 N.W.2d 821(1985); Hulsh v. Hulsh, 431 So. 2d 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 440
So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1983); Hudson v. deLaval, 382 So. 2d 1124 (Ala. 1980); Donahue v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d
741 (Ind. App. 1980); Dickson v. Renfro, 263 Ark. 718,569 S. W.2d 66 (1978); Wing v. Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co., 35 N. C. App. 346,241S. E.2d 397, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 95,244 S. E.2d 263 (1978). See also
cases cited supra note 234 for further examples.
237. Criss v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 213 Neb. 379, 329 N.W.2d 842 (1983); Sherrod v. Sherrod, 65
N.C. App. 252,308 S.E.2d 904 (1983); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Schwartz, 120 111. App. 3d 324,458
N.E.2d 151 (1983);In re Estate ofRosenzweig, 88 A.D.2d 619,450 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982);
Joyner v. Duncan, 299 N.C. 565,264 S.E.2d 76 (1980); Lewis v. Green, 389 So.2d 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980), cert. denied, 397 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1981) ; Austin v. Dobbins, 219 Va. 930, 252 S.E.2d 588
(1979); Underwood v. MacKendree, 242 Ga. 666, 251 S.E.2d 264 (1978); Southern Bank & Trust Co. v.
Brown, 271 S.C. 260, 246 S.E.2d 598 (1978).
238. 218 Va. 333, 237 S.E.2d 388 (1977).
239. The former situation is illustrated by Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Brody, 174 Conn. 616,
392 A.2d 445 (1978); the latter by Hulsh v. Hulsh, 431 So. 2d 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (reversing lower
court on point), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d. 352 (Fla. 1983).
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Validating litigation may also take place because lawyers (and some-
times judges) do not understand the Rule well enough to recognize in-
stances of validity.240 If it is not malpractice to violate the rule, 241 one
would assume that it is not malpractice to litigate a perpetuities case,
though it be without merit.242
Ultimately, refinement is called for to reduce (and virtually eliminate)
litigation under the Rule. Why should courts invalidate interests which
everyone agrees should not be invalidated? Why should court time be taken
up with validating interests? Why should the share for intended benefici-
aries be diminished by legal fees?
B. Suggestions for Refining the Rule
There is general agreement that the common law Rule Against Per-
petuities should not invalidate an interest because of some trap, one of
Leach's improbable occurrences. Over the years, many have recommended
legislation to deal with the specific traps publicized by Leach. For exam-
ple, Professor Mechem wrote in 1959:
So, it all seems to me rather sad. The common-law rule is sound in
conception and certain in operation. All of the objections to it-mostly its
operation in freak cases, to tell the truth--can be eliminated by a few simple
modifications of the common-law rule. These would be non-controversial and
easy to enforce. A simple solution of a problem whose scope has been greatly
exaggerated.243
I assume most would agree it would also be desirable to reduce or
eliminate validating litigation. Such litigation results in defeating the
transferor's intent to the extent the legal fees diminish the shares of the
intended beneficiaries. 244
The common law Rule should be refined by specific legislation to meet
the principal objections: invalidation because of a technical violation and
undesirable validating litigation. Legislation would include specific stat-
utory repair of the common law traps, together with the judicial power to
reform any interest which still violated the Rule. 245 The package would also
240. See, e.g., Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 35 N.C. App. 346, 241 S.E.2d 397, cert.
denied, 295 N.C. 95,244 S.E.2d 263 (1978); Donahue v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 741 (Ind. App. 1980).
241. See supra note 195.
242. Malpractice in the litigation is another question.
243. Mechem, Further Thoughts, supra note 8, at 983.
244. See, e.g., Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 35 N.C. App. 346, 241 S.E.2d 397, cert.
denied, 295 N.C. 95,244 S.E.2d 263 (1978).
245. SeeBrowder, Construction, Reformation andtheRuleAgainstPerpetuities, 62MICH. L. REv. 1
(1963) [hereinafter Browder, Construction].
Washington Law Review Vol. 62:23 1987
include statutes encouraging saving clauses and settlement. The suggested
legislation is set out in the Appendix.2 46
The first three statutes-saving clause encouragement, settlement au-
thority and specific repairs-will be briefly explained. In addition, the
justification for cy pres power will be addressed.
SAVING CLAUSE STATUTE
If a provision in an instrument terminates a nonvested property interest that
has not vested 2] years after the death of the survivor of a group of individuals
identified by name or by reference to an identifiable class and alive when the
period of the common law Rule began to run, that interest is valid. If
determining the death of the survivor would be impracticable, the validity of
the property interest must be determined as if that provision did not exist.
This statute is designed to publicize and thereby encourage the use of
saving clauses. It tracks the language under a draft version of the USRAP 247
which sought to improve upon the Restatement's provision. 248 By sanction-
ing saving clauses, Hagemann24 9 would be effectively overruled. This
statute also applies to trust provisions and other arrangements whereby
termination is based on a period up to 21 years after the death of specified
persons. 250
SETTLEMENT STATUTE
A court may approve a good faith compromise of a perpetuities matter if it
is just and reasonable to all parties, including unborn and unascertained
246. Because the refinements are to the common law Rule, a codification of the Rule is necessary. A
"simple" solution would continue or slightly modify Gray's one-line formulation. Seesupra note 16. This
was the approach under the Model Rule Against Perpetuities. MODEL RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES ACT.
9C U.L.A. 76 (1957).
A more ambitious undertaking would provide definitions, operating rules, and exceptions. See J.
GAUBATZ & 1. BLooMt, ESTATES, TRUSTS AND TAXES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE WEALTH TRANSNIS-
SION PROCESS 17-I1. 12 (1983) (identifying areas ripe for codification) [hereinafter J. GAUBATZ & I.
BLOOt]. The USRAP moves somewhat in this direction, especially in the powers area. See US RAP § I(b)
and (c) (relating to validity of powers), §2 (relating to when power or nonvested interest created) (1986).
Ultimately, a comprehenstve codification of the common law Rule could rival some of the more complex
provisions under the Internal Revenue Code. Such an undertaking is beyond the purview of this article.
247. DRAFT USRAP (Summer 1985), supra note 43, at 3-4. 16-17, 21-23. Because American
lawyers have not attempted to abuse saving clauses-including the use of "royal lives" clauses-it is not
expected that the " impractical" standard will be invoked. If problems arise under the standard, there will
be time enough to consider limiting the number of permissible lives. For now. violation of the impractica-
ble standard would require a court to use its cy pres power.
248. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.3(1) (1983).
249. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
250. See DRAFT USRAP (Summer 1985), supra note 43. at 23.
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persons. For this purpose, a guardian shall be appointed to represent unborn
and unascertained persons.
Designed to publicize and thereby encourage settlements in the per-
petuities area, this statute most likely would be declaratory of existing law
regarding judicial authority to approve settlements. 251 Its reference to
representatives of unborn and unascertained persons-guardians ad
litem-sanctions judicial settlements which may not have been previously
considered. 252
Clearly, settlement is preferable to litigation under the specific repair or
cy pres statutes. 253 These latter provisions should also encourage settle-
ment because they define and effectively limit the potential gain from
litigation. Additionally, the settlement statute could be expanded to provide
procedures for securing approval of a compromise. 254
STATUTORY RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
(a) Unless a contrary intention appears, the rules of construction in this
section apply if an interest would be void under the common law Rule.
(b) The rules of construction apply in the order set forth in the following
paragraphs. A rule shall be applied only if necessary to validate an interest.
This statute provides rules of construction designed to avoid traps which
result in perpetuities violations. The technique effectively requires initial
determination of invalidity, but owing to the Rule's complexity, determina-
tion may be problematic. Assume, for example, invalidity is determined by
applying the first two steps under the causal relationship methodology, as
follows: "First, we assemble the causally-connected lives, who fix the
251. See IV A. ScoTT, THE LAW OFTRUSTS § 337.6 (3d ed. 1967). The proposed statute borrows, in
part, from the general compromise statute under the Uniform Probate Code. See UNI. PROBATE CODE
§3-1102, 8 U.L.A. 490-91 (1972). It may also be possible to affect an out-of-court settlement. See id.
§ 3-912; In re Disston's Estate, 349 Pa. 129, 36 A.2d 457 (1944).
252. As noted, perpetuities settlements, with or without court approval, are not utilized in practice.
See supra text accompanying notes 92, 93. The reason may be explained as follows: a perpetuities
problem invariably affects unborn and unascertained persons, necessitating actual, as distinct from
virtual, representation by guardians ad litem. In turn, the general authority of guardians ad litem to
effectuate compromises, let alone compromises on perpetuities matters, is uncertain. See generally
Begleiter, The GuardianAdLitem in Estate Proceedings, 20WILLAMlm=rL. REv. 643 (1984). Under the
Uniform Probate Code, however, unborn and unascertained persons may be bound by court-approved
settlements. See UmF. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-1101, 3-1102. These sections also contemplate the appoint-
ment of guardians ad litem. See id. §3-1102 comment.
253. Settlement may be rejected if neither in good faith, nor just and reasonable. Cf. UNIF. PROBATE
CODE§ 3-1102(3);Cothamv. FirstNat'lBank,287Ark. 167,697S.W.2d 101(1985) (rejectingsettlement
because there was no perpetuities violation).
254. See Urti. PROBATE CODE § 3-1102.
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limits of the perpetuities period. Second, we test each of these lives in
search of a validating life." 255 If, after testing the relevant lives in being, the
interest is void under the common law Rule, constructional rules apply
rather than a wait-and-see approach. 256 In essence, the specific repair
method takes care of identified problems rather than hoping that the
problems disappear under the causal-lives or some other wait-and-see
version. 257
The proposed statute provides five constructional rules which apply in
the absence of contrary intent. These rules would provide judges and
lawyers with specific directions for obtaining a specific result: validation of
an interest. In contrast to a system which fails to specify the order in which
specific statutes are to be applied,2 58 the proposed approach would spare
judges (and lawyers) the burden of determining the solution.
RULE 1: ADMINISTRATIVE CONTINGENCIES RULE
RULE 2: FERTILE OCTOGENARIAN RULE
RULE 3: UNBORN WIDOW RULE
(1) Administrative Contingencies
Where the duration of vesting of an interest is contingent upon the probate of a
will, the appointment of afiduciary, the location of a distributee, the payment
of debts, the sale of assets, the settlement of an estate, the determination of
questions relating to an estate or transfer tax, or the occurrence of any
specified contingency, the instrument shall be construed to require such
255. Dukeminier, The Measuring Lives, supra note 9, at 1656.
256. At this point under the causal-lives method, we would wait and see whether the remote event
occurred within the lifetime of a causally-related life plus 21 years. Id.
Professor Dukeminier proposes to eliminate the second step of the causal-lives method-testing for
validity under the common law Rule. He asserts it is irrelevant whether an interest violates the common
law Rule. Id. at 1711. Waggoner objects, noting the unnecessary administrative burdens entailed. Wag-
goner, Perspective, supra note 9, at 1725-26. Moreover, Professor Dukeminier's approach would not
eliminate application of the common law Rule when construing instruments for both tax and non-tax
purposes. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
257. Consider Professor Browder's views:
The required certainty of vesting is no hardship except in those cases where extremely unlikely
possibilities of remote vesting constitute boobytraps for unwary draftsmen. Wait-and-see does
remove these pitfalls. But fortunately these extreme cases appear in identifiable patterns, which can
be dealt with specifically. New York this year was the first to provide such an alternative to wait-and-
see. This alternative has the advantage of rendering such interests valid immediately, while under the
wait-and-see rule we may have to wait for a favorable judgment until after the prescribed period of
waiting is over.
Browder, Future Interest Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1255, 1276 (1960) (footnotes omitted).
258. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 9-1.2, 9-1.3 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1986). The
complex English system provides rules and an ordering scheme somewhat similar to this proposal. There
is one crucial difference: England's wait-and-see regime also applies. See R. MAUDSLEY, THE MODERN
LAW, supra note 41, at 110-95 (discussing Perpetuities and Accumulations Act of 1964).
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contingency to occur, if at all, within 21 years from the effective date of the
instrument creating such interest.
(2) Unrealistic Birth Possibilities; Possibility of Adoption Disregarded
(A) Where the validity of a disposition depends upon the ability of a person
to have a child at some future time, it shall be presumed, subject to sub-
paragraph (B), that a male can have a child at 14 years of age or over, but not
under that age, and that afemale can have a child at 12 years of age or over,
but not under that age or over the age of 55 years.
(B) In the case of a living person, evidence may be given to establish
whether he or she is able to have a child at the time in question.
(C) Where the validity of a disposition depends upon the ability of a person
to have a child at some future time, the possibility that such person may have
a child by adoption shall be disregarded.
(3) Unborn Person Possibility
Where an interest would be invalid because of the possibility that the
person to whom it is given or limited may be a person not in being at the time
of the creation of the interest, and such person is referred to in the instrument
creating such interest as the spouse, widow, or widower of another person, it
shall be conclusively presumed that such reference is to a person in being on
the effective date of the instrument.
The first three rules respond to familiar traps publicized by Professor
Leach: remote administrative contingencies, the fertile octogenarian, and
the unborn widow.259 The order can effectuate the transferor's (presumed)
intention; it is highly doubtful that transferors consider such fantastic
possibilities. 260 The language generally tracks New York law,261 although
259. Leach, Reign of Terror, supra note 3.
260. Consider a testamentary disposition to sister S for life, remainder to S's widower for life,
remainderto S's children who survive herwidower. Assume the decedent was survived by S (60 years old)
and three children, A, B, and C. S will be presumed incapable of having additional children. Hence, we
will know within the lifetimes ofA, B, and C whetherthey survive the widower, whetherornothe was alive
at decedent's death. By first applying the unrealistic birth construction, the unborn widower will be
allowed to take. Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, 194(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (unborn widow statute
applies before fertile octogenarian statute).
261. See N. Y. EST. POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 9-1.3(d) (administrative contingency), § 9-1.3(e)
(fertile octogenarian), § 9-1.3(c) (unborn widow) (McKinney 1967 &Supp. 1986). Theproposalcontains
a presumption against unrealisticbirth possibilities, but does not resolve the issue of whether and to what
extent a person who is born despite the presumption takes. Compare N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRusTs LAW§ 9-1.3 and Practice Commentary (McKinney Supp. 1986) (favors taking) with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30,
para. 194(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986) (bars taking), discussed in Schuyler, The Statute Concerning
Perpetuities, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 3,40-46 (1970).
Unlike the New York and Illinois reform systems, the proposal also sanctions cy pres reformation. See
infra notes 277-96 and accompanying text. Accordingly, violations not cured by the rules of construction
can be resolved from the outset if it can be shown that a transfeior contemplated the unusual, e.g., the
existence of an unborn widow.
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variations are possible. 262
RULE 4: AGE REDUCTION RULE
(4) Reduction of Age to 21 for Vesting Purposes: Deferred Possession
Allowed
(A) If an interest would be invalid under the common law rule because
made to depend for its vesting upon any person attaining an age in excess of
21 years, the age contingency shall be reduced to 21 years for vesting
purposes only.
(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), possession of the interest shall be
postponed to the age specified in the instrument or to age 50, whichever
occurs sooner.
(C) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the person or persons entitled to
the property or enjoyment thereof from age 21 and until the age prescribed in
the instrument, shall continue such entitlement.
The fourth constructional rule differs from traditional age reduction
statutes.2 63 It requires vesting by age 21, but delays possession until the
prescribed age (under 50 years) is reached. In addition, the proposed
statute confirms the rights of the intended takers of interim income. 264
Consider the following example:
T in trust to my daughter A for life, remainder to A's children who reach age
25. Residue to B. T is survived by A (a widow under age 55) and two children,
ages 3 and 7.
Pursuant to Rule 4, the will provision will be construed as follows:
T to A for life, remainder to A's children who reach age 21, with payment
postponed until each reaches age 25; interim income to B.
Assuming the two children alive at T's death reach age 21, their interests
will vest, but they will not receive possession until they reach age 25.
Interim income will go to B as intended. Afterborn children can be
included in the class. 265
262. Professor Waggoner discusses various alternatives. Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, supra note
21, at 1735-55. Forexample, the Illinois "fertile octogenarian" statute applies to both sexes after age 65 is
attained and applies after its "unborn widow" and "age reduction" provisions. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30,
para. 194(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
263. See, e.g.. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-96 (West 1981).
264. In a few states, additional legislation may be necessary to modify "next eventual taker" rules.
See supra note 101.
265. Under the constructional "rule of convenience," a class will close when a member can call for
distribution. See L. SMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 17, § 640. In the text example, no afterborn children
will be excluded because all potential takers will be determined at A's death.
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The principal objection to age reduction statutes, that the intended
beneficiary receives possession at too early an age, is solved by Rule 4.266
The only practical difference between the reformed and original disposi-
tions is if an untimely death occurs between ages 21 and 25.267 Because the
interest will be vested, the child will be entitled to transmit the interest, and
the interest will be subject to federal estate tax. 268 The intended taker in
default of attaining an age in excess of 21 will still receive interim income,
but cannot succeed to the property if the child dies after age 21.
Rule 4 produces two additional benefits in class gift dispositions. First, it
prevents the operation of the all-or-nothing rule in excess age cases. 269
Second, it eliminates the necessity of choosing between two constructions:
reduction in age or limitation to class members alive at time of creation. 270
By operation of Rule 4-which requires age reduction for vesting purposes
only-afterborn members can be included.271
Rule 4 would not apply when an interest is nonvested because dependent
upon a person failing to attain an age in excess of 21.272 Although the trap
could be overcome by an age reduction statute, the transferor's intention
could be better carried out under the court's cy pres power. 273
RULE 5: CLASS GIFT CONSTRUCTIONAL RULE
(5) Class gift construction
If an interest would be invalid under the common law Rule by including
266. Professor Waggoner raises this objection. See Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, supra note 21, at
1757.
267. Since such deaths are most unlikely, the rare frustration of intention maybe of no great moment.
But cf. Freund, ThreeSuggestions ConcerningFuturelnterests, 33 HARV. L. REv. 526,533 (1920) ("A gift
at twenty-one is not logically included in a gift at twenty-five, because the former is a larger gift, and the
more is not included in the less.").
268. Technically, estate taxation could be avoided by a timely disclaimer if a child died within 9
months of attaining age 21. See I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)(B).
269. See Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, supra note 22, at 646 (example 18), 649 n.28 (example
24). See generally Leach, Gifts to Classes, supra note 24.
270. For example, the intermediate appellate court in Merrill v. Wimmer, 453 N.E.2d 356 (Ind.
App. 1983), vacated, 481 N.E.2d 1294 (Ind. 1985), excluded afterborns. See supra text accompanying
note 226. Professor Leach discussed a solution to this dilemma under a cy pres statute. J. MORRIS & W.
LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 35 (1956).
271. See supra note 265.
272. Consider the following illustration:
Bequest by T in trust, income to S for life. At the death of S, income to be divided among S's then
living descendants until each reaches age 30. When any descendant reaches age 30, his share of the
corpus is then to be paid to him. Upon the death of any descendant before age 30, his share of the
corpus is to be added to the shares of the other living descendants. At T's death, S is an infant. Cf.
Walker v. Bogle, 244 Ga. 439, 260 S.E.2d 338 (1979).
J. GAUBATZ & 1. BLOOM, supra note 246, problem 17-3 at 17-32 (1983).
273. See infra text accompanying notes 277-96.
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afterborn persons within a class, afterborns shall be excluded from the class
to the extent necessary to avoid a violation under the common law Rule.
Rule 5 codifies the preference for construing class gifts in a manner
which results in validation under the common law Rule. 274 Consider the
following disposition:
T to A for life, remainder to A's children for life, remainder to A's grand-
children who reach age 25. T is survived by A who is 50 years old and two
children, B and C.
Rule 4 will require vesting of A's grandchildren's interests when each
reaches age 21. Yet, the ultimate remainder is void because A's grand-
children will not necessarily be determined within the perpetuities period.
A could have an afterborn child, D. D could have children and be the
surviving child. Hence the class of grandchildren could vest outside the
period. Rule 5 will require trust termination when the survivor of B and C
dies. In addition, D can share in income and D's children born before B and
C die can receive corpus.
Rule 5 would solve the all-or-nothing rule's operation in the majority of
two-generation cases. 275 Together with Rules 2 and 4, Rule 5 defuses the
all-or-nothing rule. 276
CY PRES STATUTE
If after application of theforegoing statutes, an interest would be invalid
under the common law Rule, a court shall reform the interest within the limits
of the Rule by approximating the transferor's intention as nearly as possible.
For this purpose, extrinsic evidence shall be admissible.
Specific repair statutes can address the technical violations of the com-
mon law Rule. As Professor Waggoner correctly states: " [I]nvalidity in the
technical violation cases is so easily reversed by the specific statutory
repair method of reform." 277
Professor Waggoner attempts to justify a wait-and-see regime because it
applies in all cases of perpetuities violation-not only those occasioned by
274. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. The English system has somewhat similarclass gift
rules which apply after the wait-and-see period. See Perpetuities and Accumulations Act § 4(3), (4),
discussed in R. MAUDSLEY, THE MODERN LAW, supra note 41, at 143-46.
275. See Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, supra note 22, at 651 (example 27).
276. Professor Leach desired the same result. See Leach, Gifts to Classes, supra note 24. The
English system also defuses the all-or-nothing rule but only after its wait-and-see period. See R.
MAUDSLEY, THE MODERN LAW, supra note 41, at 143-45.
277. Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, supra note 21, at 1719.
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a technical violation. 278 Yet, he fails to identify cases which do not involve
technical violations. 279 His earlier words are significant:
The number of property interests which as of the date of creation are almost
but not quite certain to vest if at all in due time, but which do not fall within
the categories covered by the specific statutory repair method, is probably
infinitesimal. Consequently the fact that the wait and see method saves from
automatic invalidity all such interests, whereas the specific statutory repair
method saves only those which fall within the fertile octogenarian, the
administrative contingency, the unborn widow, and the age-contingency-in-
excess-of-21 categories is rather insignificant. 280
There is, however, a method for reaching beyond specific statutory repair
by sanctioning judicial reformation: cy pres. The opportunity for cy pres
exists when an interest is not saved by some repair statute. This may occur in
two situations. First, a specific repair statute may be foregone because cy pres
will better effectuate intention. Arguably, cy pres is a better solution when
interests are invalid because trusts extend beyond 21 years, 281 and when
vesting depends on the failure of a person to attain an age in excess of 21
years. 282
More importantly, cy pres is appropriate as a backstop to specific repair
statutes. Inevitably there will be a case which cannot be repaired. Consider
the following:
Bequest by T in trust to A for life, remainder to A's children for life (T's
grandchildren), remainder to A's grandchildren (T's great-grandchildren). T
is survived by child A, who is 2 years old.
After applying the rules of construction, the remainder to T's great-
grandchildren is still void under the common law Rule.283
In response, it may be suggested that the above disposition is not a
"technical violation," but an unreasonable attempt to extend dead hand
278. Id.
279. Professor Waggoner suggested that certain cases involved non-technical violations, but he did
not identify these cases. Id. at 1784 n. 162.
280. L. WAGGONER, NutsHELL, supra note 6, at 298 (emphasis in original).
281. Forexample, in Berry v. Union Nat'lBank, 262 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1980), atrust was to last for
25 years. Although the court, applying its cy pres powers, reduced the duration to 21 years, a more creative
solution could be found. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8104213 (Oct. 31, 1980) (trust termination in 32 years with
saving clause).
282. See supra note 272. See generally Browder, Construction, supra note 245.
283. This example differs from the one in the text accompanying note 274 supra in one critical
respect:A has no children. As a result, the remainder toA's grandchildren cannot be validated by Rule 5.
See supra note 261 (suggesting other cases for reformation).
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control to two unborn generations. 284 Hence, invalidation is appropriate,
and the remainder should pass to the residuary or intestate takers.
The problem with invalidation is inevitable case-by-case litigation under
the infectious invalidity doctrine. 285 The Restatement of Property suggests
that a court ask the following question:
If the [testator or settlor] should now examine his proposed plan of disposition
with the parts excised therefrom which have been found to offend the rule
against perpetuities, would he decide that his original scheme of disposition
would be more closely approximated by invalidating all ... or part ... of the
balance, or by allowing the balance to take effect in accordance with its terms
9286
Although otherwise valid interests will likely be sustained, 287 the legal
process-including generation of legal fees-would be involved. If a court
must attempt to ascertain intent in cases of invalidity, would it not be
preferable to have the court ascertain intent for a constructive purpose? 288
Consider the words of Professor Leach:
All that is needed is to adopt the cy pres principle . . . . [T]he infectious
invalidity rule is simply a cy pres doctrine based upon an assumption of
invalidity of the gift-the court considers which arrangement would "more
closely approximate" the testator's wishes . . . .Just turn this idea around
and perform the same process on the assumption of validity of the gift within
the limits of the Rule-and the job is done; since there is no invalidity at all,
but only reformation, there is no infectious invalidity problem.28 9
In fact, Professor Leach approved of the statutory repair method if
combined with immediate cy pres: "'Of course, it would also be possible to
have the specific provisions, and, in addition, a blanket statute to take care
of cases not within any of the particular provisions.' [I agree one hundred
per cent ..... ]"290
The objections to cy pres-including objections by wait-and-see oppo-
nents-are based on the necessity for litigation and the potential for
rewriting wills. 29 1 Professor Leach stated in defense:
284. See L. WAGGONER, NUTSHELL, supra note 6, at 298.
285. See supra text accompanying note 239.
286. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 402 comment a (1944).
287. See, e.g., Walker v. Bogle, 244 Ga. 439,260 S.E.2d 338 (1979). But see Connecticut Bank &
Trust Co. v. Brody, 174 Conn. 616, 392 A.2d 445 (1978). "
288. See Browder, Construction, supra note 245, at 19-20.
289. Leach, Hail Penns'yvania, supra note 19, at 1149 (emphasis in original).
290. Id. at 1150 (emphasis in original). The quoted sentence was written by Professor Simes; the
parenthetical statement was Professor Leach's comment thereto. Professor Browder urged the same
solution. Browder, Construction, supra note 245. at 15.
291. See, e.g., Powell Memorandum, supra note 10, at 138; L. SiMES, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 13.
at 78-79. Professor Simes preferred enactment of specific statutes to deal with any new situations. Id.
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The big incentive to perpetuities litigation, and to the threat of litigation that
forces serious concession by way of compromise, is its all-or-nothing charac-
ter. If the contestant wins, the proponent gets nothing. But when the issue is
limited to the question of what reformation within the limits of the Rule will
most closely approximate the testator's intent, the spectrum of possible choices
is very narrow, hardly worth litigating. 292
Professor Leach's instincts have proven to be correct. From the four
states which legislatively prescribe immediate cy pres reformation, 293 only
two California cases have been reported. Both involved a violation based on
attaining an age in excess of 21.294 In effect, there would have been no cy
pres cases from California-our most populous state-if, in 1963, Califor-
nia had also adopted an age reduction construction rule. Similarly, there
have been no reported cy pres cases from the five states after initial judicial
adoption of the cy pres dodtrine. 295
Another feature could be added to the cy pres statute, specifically the
allowance of extrinsic evidence to ascertain the transferor's intent.296 This
measure would ensure better effectuation of the transferor's intent and in the
process, would overcome any concern that a judge may arbitrarily and
unwittingly rewrite a will. Finally, settlement would be further encouraged.
C. Note on Powers
This article has not specifically focused on powers of appointment.
Because powers are subject to the common law Rule, 297 invalidity can be
avoided under the suggested scheme for refinement. 298
Professor Maudsley also objected to an immediate cy pres approach. 1979ALlProceedings, supra note 4,
at 464 (remarks of Professor Maudsley).
292. Leach, Hail Pennsylvania, supra note 19, at 1150.
293. California (CAL. Civ. CODE § 715.5 (Deering 1971)); Missouri (Mo. REv. STAT. § 442.555
(1965 Supp.)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 75.76 (West 1971 & Supp. 1985)); Texas (TEx.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.043 (Vernon 1984)). Although these statutory provisions prescribe reformation
whenever possible, the proposal contemplates reform in all situations.
294. Estate ofGrove, 70 Cal. App. 3d 355,138 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1977);In re Estate ofGhiglia, 42 Cal.
App. 3d 433, 116 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1974).
295. Berry v. Union Nat'l Bank, 164 W. Va. 258,262 S.E.2d 766 (1980);In re Estate ofChun Quan
Yee Hop, 52 Haw. 40,469 P.2d 183 (1970); In re Foster's Estate, 190 Kan. 498, 376 P.2d 784 (1962);
Carterv. Berry, 243 Miss. 321,140So. 2d 843 (1962); Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434,31 A. 900 (1891).
296. Extrinsic evidence is admissible in charitable cases involving the cy pres doctrine. See G.
BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 437,442 (rev. 2d ed. 1977). Extrinsic
evidence, including testimony from the drafting attorney, has been admitted in infectious invalidity cases.
Seeln re EstateofAnziano, 39A.D.2d771,332N.Y.S.2d 651(1972), aff'd, 32N.Y.2d 875,299 N.E.2d
897, 346 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1973).
297. Special rules in relation to powers may apply under the common law Rule. See L. SIMES & A.
SMITH, supra note 17, §§ 1271-1278. See generally Berger, TheRuleAgainstPerpetuitiesas itRelates to
Powers ofAppointment, 41 NEB. L. REv. 583 (1962).
298. New York case law suggests that violations will be repaired when powers are exercised invalidly
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V. CONCLUSION
In response to Professor Leach's basic question: "Why should we not
'wait-and-see' . . . ?1"299 we should not "wait-and-see" for the innumera-
ble reasons detailed in this article. The most compelling reason is that the
common law Rule has not caused any real problems. 300 Accordingly, we
should not "use . . . an atomic cannon to kill a gnat. "301
Many of the other arguments for rejecting the wait-and-see cannon
confirm Professor Powell's suspicions: "The inconveniences, unavoidably
generated by the proposal, as to the costliness of litigation, and as to the
controversies concerning contingent rights passing from generation to
generation have been neither recognized nor adequately considered. "302
Professor Berger's criticism of the Restatement's approach properly ex-
tends to all wait-and-see methods: "I am afraid that if we adopt the
[Restatement] package . . .wait and see, and remote cy pres, we are
creating a minefield for future generations. '303
A case does exist, however, for refining the common law Rule. By
refinement, any harsh results under the Rule, as well as unnecessary
litigation, can be eliminated. In addition to a statute encouraging settle-
ments, the refinement technique relies upon specific repair statutes. 3°4
Detractors claim specific statutes cannot repair all conceivable situa-
tions.305 They also suggest the difficulty in convincing legislatures to act
when a new situation arises. 30 6 The response is that no new traps have been
under the common law Rule. SeeIn re Martin's Will, 58 Misc. 2d 740,296 N.Y.S.2d498 (1968) (applying
New York's age reduction statute because exercise violated New York's suspension (but also common
law) Rule)). Because New York does not have acy pres provision, some invalid dispositions on exercising
powers will not be saved. SeeIn re Harden, N.Y.L. J., Sept. 17, 1985, at 13, col. 6 (N.Y. Co. Surr.) (also
applying infectious invalidity doctrine).
299. See supra text accompanying note 3.
300. Professor Mechem once asked: "Is the common-law rule really working so badly?" Mechem,
Further Thoughts, supra note 8, at 966. The answer is, "definitely not." See also Volkmer, The Law of
Future Interests in Nebraska (Part I1), 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 601, 649-50 (1985).
301. Dukeminier, Perpetuities Revision, supra note 12.
302. Powell Memorandum, supra note 10, at 128-29.
303. 1979 ALl Proceedings, supra note 4, at 456 (remarks of Professor Berger). Many of Dean
Rohan's reservations over the Restatement (Second) version apply to the general wait-and-see approach.
See 5A R. POWELL, supra note 8, 827F[3].
304. Even Professor Waggoner acknowledges the virtues of repair statutes:
In achieving the objective of perpetuity... [refinement], the specific statutory repair method holds
the disturbance of settled law and know-how to a minimum, operates predictably, and does not
interfere with the ability of a litigant to obtain at any time a final judgment that an interest is either
valid or invalid. In contrast, the wait and see concept constitutes a fundamental modificaiton of the
common law Rule Against Perpetuities.
L. WAGGONER, NUTSHELL, supra note 6, at 300.
305. See, e.g.,1978ALI Proceedings, supra note 4, at 286-87 (remarks of Dean William Schwartz).
306. See, e.g., Leach, Legislatures, supra note 191, at 358-59.
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discovered recently.307 Assuming, arguendo, the validity of the detractors'
stance, the unrepaired trap will be repaired (absent settlement) under the
court's cy pres power. 308 Unlike deferred cy pres under the wait-and-see
approach, 309 cy pres reformation will be relied upon only as a last resort. 310
In the final analysis, the combination of perpetuities refinement by
settlement, specific repair, and cy pres statutes is far preferable to any wait-
and-see method. 311 Even if there were more statutes by the former ap-
proach, it can be safely predicted that the "swell of the law" caused by the
added legislation will be less than the swell resulting from litigation under
the wait-and-see approach. 312
The wait-and-see approach has not been characterized as a "reform"
measure in this article. The concept of "reform" does not encompass such
elements as: solving a nonexistent problem, encouraging dead hand con-
trol, engrafting complexity, fostering litigation, and burdening future gen-
erations with problems which can be immediately resolved. In truth, wait-
and-see appears to be a misguided attempt to embellish upon the common
law Rule. States should seriously consider repealing their wait-and-see
legislation.
The true spirit of perpetuities reform involves changing the common law
Rule itself. 313 Various reforms have been suggested. 314 For example, the
feudal concept of vesting could be discarded; this would effectively require
possession within the perpetuities period. 315 But because the common law
307. This statement excludes traps under commercial transactions. Consider Professor Maudsley's
view: "New problems may well arise; but if we find a solution to all those which have appeared since 1680,
that should, from a practical point of view, be acceptable." R. MAUDSLEY, THE MODERN LAW, supra note
41, at81.
308. Indeed, Professor Waggoner has extolled the cy pres (reformation) method: "In fact, however,
the reformation method does not alter the Rule at all. It leaves theRule intact and changes the disposition
to conform to the Rule." Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 33, at 548 (emphasis in original).
309. See supra text accompanying notes 135-48.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 277-96.
311. Professor Fletcher, a wait-and-see opponent, recommended another method of perpetuities
refinement. Fletcher, A Rule of Discrete Invalidity: Perpetuities Reform Without Waiting, 20 STAN. L.
REV. 459 (1968).
312. ProfessorLeach criticized the "penny-packetstatutory method' becauseit results in "swelling
the mass of law."' Leach & Morris, BookReview, 54 MICH. L. REv. 580, 581 (1956) (reviewing L. SIMEs,
PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 13).
313. Although some would consider abrogation of the rule to be reform, most believe some rule
against perpetuities is desirable. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. See Glenn, Perpetuities to
Purefoy:Reform byAbolition in Manitoba, 62 CAN. B. REv. 618 (1984) (criticizing Manitoba's repeal of
the common law Rule).
314. See, e.g., Deech,LivesinBeingRevived, 97 LAw. Q. REv. 593 (1981) (advocating fixed term of
years in lieu of lives in being). Anotherreform could limit saving clauses to a period ofyears, e.g., 50 to 60
years.
315. This proposal was first made by Professor Simes. L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 13, at
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Rule has caused no serious problems, major changes are not appropriate.
As Professor Simes cautioned: "In the United States there is a long history
of attempts to substitute another type of rule for the Rule against Per-
petuities. And if anything can be deduced from that history, it is this. All
attempts to substitute a new rule have proved to be unsatisfactory. '316
Minor reforms may be appropriate. For example, Professor Dukeminier
justifiably urges changes in the so-called "commercial transactions"
area. 317 Such reformation is supported by the litigation brought during the
eight-year period, 1978-1985. Of the approximately 100 reported cases,
with a 25% invalidation rate, most involved commercial leases, options,
and preemptive rights.318 At the same time, commercial-type transactions
can be created by a trust or will disposition. 319 Although all such violations
can be avoided by a saving clause, shorter time periods are desirable. 32 0
Lawyers and law students certainly should be cautioned about the dangers
of perpetuities violations in commercial transactions 32 1 because the num-
ber of commercial violations greatly exceeds the number of violations in
the donative transfer area.
An additional reform might be considered. Specifically, an attorney
could be subject to malpractice liability for drafting an instrument which
contains a perpetuities violation without a saving clause. Although mal-
practice liability is not the ultimate answer,322 its threat may encourage
80-82. It was later embraced by Professor Schuyler. Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities
Discard Its Vest? 56 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1958). Illinois substantially adopted the Schuyler proposal in
1969. See Schuyler, The Statute Concerning Perpetuities, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 3 (1970) (discussing Illinois
legislation).
316. L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 13, at 72. Although the Illinois statute has been criticized.
Further Trends in Perpetuities, 5 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 333, 342-45 (1970). there have been no
reported cases under the system.
317. See Dukeminier. The Measuring Lives, supra note 9,'at 1706-08. By limiting the Restatement
(Second) to donative transfers, Professor Casner intentionally barred consideration ofthe Rule in relation
to commercial transactions. 1978 ALl Proceedings, supra note 4, at 225. Professor Powell criticized this
decision. Powell Memorandum, supra note 10, at 127. As adopted, the USRAP alsoexcludes commercial
(nondonative) transfers from its Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. USRAP § 4(l)(1986).
318. See, e.g., Siniard v. Davis. 678 P.2d 1197 (Okla. 1984) (invalidating a commercial lease);
Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 58 N.Y.2d 867,447 N.E.2d 76,460 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1983) (invalidating
an option); Perry v. Brundage, 200 Colo. 229, 614 P.2d 362 (1980) (invalidating a preemptive rights
agreement).
319. See Kaufman v. Zimmer, 287 N.W.2d 884 (Iowa 1979).
320. USRAP drafts recommended 40-year duration rules for commercial transactions. See, e.g..
DRAFr USRAP (Spring, 1986), supra note 1, at77-86. These rules were deleted from the finaldraft. UNIF.
STATUTORY R. AGAINST PERPETUITIES (Discussion Draft July 31, 1986).
321. The drafter first should ascertain whether the commercial transaction is subject to the Rule. For
example, the New York Court of Appeals recently held that preemptive rights (rights of first refusal) in
commercial and governmental transactions are not subject to the Rule. Metropolitan Transit Auth. v.
Bruken Realty Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 156, 492 N.E.2d 379, 501 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1986).
322. See Langbein & Waggoner. supra note 33, at 588-90.
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universal use of saving clauses.323 In the process, transferors will determine
the beneficiaries on trust termination, instead of courts making that deci-
sion under a wait-and-see system.
In the end, wait-and-see must be rejected. It imposes unnecessary and
unacceptable burdens for lives not yet in being. It is one thing to write a law
review article arguing about wait-and-see. 324 It is quite another to burden
society with it.
323. See supra note 196.
324. Professor Waggonerremarked that itwas "one thing to write a law review article" on the causal-




SUGGESTED STATUTES TO REFINE THE COMMON LAW RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES
SECTION 1: SAVING CLAUSE RECOGNITION.
If a provision in an instrument terminates a nonvested property interest
that has not vested 21 years after the death of the survivor of a group of
individuals identified by name or by reference to an identifiable class and
alive when the period of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities began
to run, that interest is valid. If determining the death of the survivor would
be impracticable, the validity of the property interest must be determined as
if that provision did not exist.
SECTION 2: SETTLEMENT AUTHORITY
A court may approve a good faith compromise of a perpetuities matter if
it is just and reasonable to all parties, including unborn and unascertained
persons. For this purpose, a guardian shall be appointed to represent
unborn and unascertained persons.
SECTION 3: RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
(a) Unless a contrary intention appears, the rules of construction in this
section apply if an interest would be void under the common law Rule
Against Perpetuities.
(b) The rules of construction apply in the order set forth in the following
paragraphs. A rule shall be applied only if necessary to validate an interest
under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities.
(1) Administrative Contingencies
Where the duration of vesting of an interest is contingent upon the
probate of a will, the appointment of a fiduciary, the location of a dis-
tributee, the payment of debts, the sale of assets, the settlement of an estate,
the determination of questions relating to an estate or transfer tax or the
occurrence of any specified contingency, the instrument shall be construed
to require such contingency to occur, if at all, within 21 years from the
effective date of the instrument creating such interest.
(2) Unrealistic Birth Possibilities; Possibility of Adoption Disregarded
(A) Where the validity of a disposition depends upon the ability of a
person to have a child at some future time, it shall be presumed, subject to
subpararaph (B), that a male can have a child at 14 years of age or over, but
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not under that age, and that a female can have a child at 12 years of age or
over, but not under that age or over the age of 55 years.
(B) In the case of a living person, evidence may be given to establish
whether he or she is able to have a child at the time in question.
(C) Where the validity of a disposition depends upon the ability of a
person to have a child at some future time, the possibility that such person
may have a child by adoption shall be disregarded.
(3) Unborn Person Possibility
Where an interest would be invalid because of the possibility that the
person to whom it is given or limited may be a person not in being at the
time of the creation of the interest, and such person is referred to in the
instrument creating such interest as the spouse, widow, or widower of
another person, it shall be conclusively presumed that such reference is to a
person in being on the effective date of the instrument.
(4) Reduction of Age to 21 for Vesting Purposes; Deferred Possession
Allowed
(A) If an interest would be invalid under the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities because made to depend for its vesting upon any person
attaining an age in excess of 21 years, the age contingency shall be reduced
to 21 years for vesting purposes only.
(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), possession of the interest shall
be postponed to the age specified in the instrument or to age 50, whichever
occurs sooner.
(C) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the person or persons entitled to
the property or enjoyment thereof, from ages 21 and until the age pre-
scribed in the instrument, shall continue such entitlement.
(5) Class Gift Construction
If an interest would be invalid under the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities by including afterborn persons within a class, afterborns shall
be excluded from the class to the extent necessary to avoid a violation under
the common law Rule Against Perpetuities.
SECTION 4: CY PRES AUTHORITY
If, after application of the foregoing statutes, an interest would be invalid
under the common law Rule, a court shall reform the interest within the
limits of the Rule by approximating the transferor's intention as nearly as
possible. For this purpose, extrinsic evidence shall be admissible.
